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.TED STATES COURT OF AP~ 
~~ 
FIFTH CIRCUIT 
. ~ ~ 
CHARLES CLARK 
CHIEF JUDGE 
January 3, 1990 I~~ (601) 3!53·0911 
24!5 EAST CAPITOL STREET, ROOM 302 
JACKSON , MISSISSIPPI 39201 
TO FORMER MEMBERS OF THE POWELL COMMITTEE 
Re: Comment to Judicial Conference 
Dear Judges: 
Since our report was submitted to the Con,t.e.J;ence, the 
[J) "Biden bill" has been developed and in~ uce~ he ABA 
report has been finalized and publisheld_,.:.-the Federal Courts 
Study Committee has circulated a draft report /4~r comment 
which includes a section on habeas corpus, an~ he 
Administrative Office has brought to our attention a 1974 
committee report and Conference action on habeas corpus. 
cA~~ The Executive Committee felt it would be helpful in 
~ focusing the Conference's March debate on our report if we 
L-A-- 1~ were to consider subsequent developments and make a written 
~ comment on their effect. I spoke with Justice Powell and he 
thinks well of the idea. Judges Hodges and Sanders have 
similarly indicated agreement to this procedure. I also 
spoke with Senior Judge Roney and found him not only 
agreeable but also williirg°'to come out of ret~me.pt 4ong 
enough to. BAAt,e cowu.ent. l w!ii c ir~ulate Judge Roney's 
draf t for• your cons ideration. 
Happy New Year, 
~ 
cc: Bill Burchill 
- -
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY 
SCHOOL OF LAW LIBRARY 
357 East Chicago Avenue 
Chicago, Illinois 60611 
~ ,j-vt/fo 
fy,/ 
January 25, 1990 
The Honorable Lewis J. Powell, Jr., Chairman 
Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee 
on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capitol Cases 
o/o Supreme Court of the United States 
U.S . Supreme Court Building 
1 First Street N. E . 
Washington, D. C. 20543 
Dear Chairman Powell : 
We would like to request a report released by the Ad Hoc Committee 
of the U. S. Judicial Conference, recommending federal legislation 
to change the habeas corpus review procedures . We would appreciate 
your sending a copy of the report to us. 
If there is a charge for this material, please notify us before 
sending it . 
Enclosed is a mailing label for your convenience . 






Compiled and edited by Barbara G. James 
Georgia State U11i1·ersi1y 
College of Law Library U11h-ersity Plaza 
Atlanta, GA 30303-3092; 404/651-2479 
Death Penalty 
Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC) has sponsored S 32, 
which would authorize the death penalty for more than 
twenty federal crimes and spell out the procedures for its 
imposition. The legislation calls for a two-stage trial with the 
sentencing portion held separately. The Senate Judiciary 
Committee subsequently adopted several amendments to the 
measure: the death penalty may not be imposed upon persons 
under the age of eighteen or upon the mentally retarded; it is 
also barred if it furthers a "racially discriminatory pattern." 
9imges must instruct juries of the following : that they must 
consider certain mitigating factors, that the jury has the 
option of finding the death penalty inappropriate, and that 
juries must certify that the sentence is not based on race or 
prejudice; and juries must be unanimous in finding at least 
one aggravating factor. The Committee then voted to send the 
measure to the Senate floor without recommendation. See 42 
Cong. Q. »0ekly Report 2805 (Oct. 21, 1989). 
Illiteracy 
The llliteracy Elimination Act, S 1310, was introduced by 
Sen. Paul Simon (D-IL) on July 13 . The act seeks to elimi-
nate illiteracy by the year 2000. It not only coordinates all 
federal legislation regarding illiteracy but also adds a number 
of new programs. Under the proposed legislation, the 
Reading is Fundamental (RIF) program would be expanded 
and a Model Literacy Demonstration Program would be 
established. Sen. Simon views libraries as central to dealing 
with the illiteracy crisis . According to Simon, most people 
are not intimidated about walking into a library and seeking 
help. See 114 Lib. J. (no. 14) 17 (Sept. 15, 1989). 
LSCA 
The Senate passed amendments to HR 2742 , an act to 
extend and amend the Library Services and Construction Act. 
The differences between the House and Senate versions are 
reportedly slight. Members of both chambers have declined 
to make major renovations to the long-standing library-aid 
programs in deference to the White House Conference on 
Library and Information Services, which will be held from 
July 9-13, 1991 . Members hope that the entire package can 
be reexamined at that time. Major proposed changes in the 
existing law would allow federal funds to be used to purchase 
technological equipment and for book preservation, would 
permit mobile library services to day care centers, and would 
authorize $500,000 to study the effectiveness of the federally 
funded library programs. See 47 Cong. Q. »0ekly Report 
2807 (Oct. 21 , 1989). 
192 AALL N<•wslclfer December 1989 
-
Habeas Corpus Reform 
Language included in the comprehensive drug legislation 
of 1988 mandated the formation of a committee to study the 
current habeas corpus review procedures. The legislation 
further provided that the committee's recommendations woulc 
be placed on an accelerated track for congressional action. 
Retired Justice Lewis Powell, chairman of the ad hoc 
committee of the U.S. Judicial Conference, released a report 
on September 21 recommending federal legislation to change 
the habeas corpus review procedures. On September 20, the 
full Judicial Conference voted to study the report and to defe1 
action until March 1990. Chief Justice Rehnquist subse-
quently forwarded the Powell Committee report to Congress 
without the Conference's approval. A majority of the Judicial 
Conference has requested that their input be considered on 
the matter. The Director of the Administrative Office of the 
U.S. Courts forwarded a request to Senator Biden, chair of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, that hearings be held to 
consider the March 1990 recommendations. However, in 
Biden's opinion, Rehnquist's action triggered the fast track 
status. The Senate Judiciary Committee held a public hearin 
on habeas corpus reform on November 8. See Nat'[ uzw J., 
Oct. 16, 1989, p. 5; 47 Cong. Q. »0ekly Report 2718 
(O~t. 14, 1989). 
GPO and the Congressional Record 
House Report 101-179, which accompanied the legisla-
tive appropriations for FY 1990 (HR 3014), denied GPO's 
request to use the unexpended balances for printing and 
reproduction costs of documents to depository libraries. As a 
cost-cutting measure, GPO decided not to print or bind paper 
copies of the final Congressional Record for the years 1986 le 
1990. Although GPO met its financial target and still has the 
funds, the Appropriations Committee decided to return the 
$250,000 per year to the Treasury where the funds will not 
be used for a depository purpose. Funds have been allocated 
for microfiche distribution of the 1986- 1990 Congressional 
Record. 
The Joint Committee on Printing has prohibited GPO 
from seeking a microfiche conversion contract for the 
Congressional Record. Unless this prohibition is rescinded , 
depositories selecting the final bound Congressional Record 
in microfiche will receive nothing after vol. 128 (1982) is 
filmed and those selecting the final bound Congressional 
Record in paper will receive neither microfiche nor paper 
after the distribution of vol. 13 I (1985). The JCP has directed 
GPO to focus on the CD-ROM version of the Congressional 
Record . All depositories will receive a test disk of vol. 13 I. 
See 10 Mmin. Notes (no. 21) 14 (Oct. 16, 1989) . 
Volume 21, No . 
-
Justice Lewis Powell 
U.S. Supreme Court 
Washington D.C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
2 6 JAN 799.0 
~ l~ ~Jk 
066L N'r/f 9 Z ~-
1-Jt 
January 25,1990 
My collegue Mark Phillips and I are working on a piece for the CBS Evening 
News about the death penalty. A part of our story will include your 
recommendations for reform in the death penalty appeals process. 
We would appreciate it if you would be willing to spend about 15 or 20 
minutes with us, for a television interview to be aired as a part of our story. 
We would like to do this on February 1st or February 5th. If there is another 
day that would be more convenient for you, we could work that out as well. 
I can be reached at (202) 457-4385. If I am not available one of my 
collegues, Paige Parisi, can make the arrangements. We would be happy to come 






CBS Evening News 
2020 M St., N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 
20036 
- - ;J.~ 
January 26, 1990 
Dear Ms. Rosenbaum: 
Thank you for your letter of January 25, in which 
you invite me to take part in an evening news program on the 
death penalty. 
I served as Chairman of a Committee appointed by 
the Chief Justice pursuant to authorization of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States. I enclose a copy of the 
report we submitted at the September meeting of the Confer-
ence. As requested by the Chief Justice I met with the 
press on the day after my report was submitted. 
I think it best, in view of this history, for me 
not to appear again at this time as an advocate. My under-
standing is that the Judicial Conference may consider sever-
al proposals, including that of my Committee when it meets 
again in March. 
I have a high opinion of CBS Evening News, and send 
best wishes. 
Ms. Jill Rosenbaum 
Producer 
CBS Evening News 
2020 M Street, N.W. 
Washington, D. C. 20036 
lfp/ss 




January 29, 1990 
Habeas Corpus Reform 
Dear Paul: 
Here are some materials on the current status of 
federal habeas reform that you may find useful in preparing 
our comments on developments since our Report issued. 
Most important is Biden's current ''reform" package, 
which includes a provision that would overrule by statute 
Mccleskey v. Kemp and Teague v. Lane, among other cases. 
I enclose also some testimony from the Justice De-
partment on the probable effects of these proposals, and 
some news accounts of President Bush's recent statements. 
It is my understanding that alternative legislative packages 
may be introduced by Senator Thurmond, and that the Adminis-
tration will also propose an alternative. 
Sincerely, 
Hon. Paul H. Roney 
U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit 
601 Federal Office Building 
St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 
lfp/ ss 
cc: The Chief Justice 
Members of the Committee 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 
William R. Burchill, Jr., Esquire 
'i . - -~nit.eh ~tat.es ~istri.ct aiourt 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
1100 COMMERCE STREET 
DALLAS . TEXAS 75242 
5 FEB 1990 
) 
CHAM • l'."S 01' 
JUDGE BAREFOOT SANDERS 
~IM~ 
January 29, 1990 
Honorable Levin H. Campbell 
Chief Judge 
United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit 
1618 John W. McCormack Post Office & Courthouse 
Boston, Massachusetts 02109 
Re: Federal Courts study Committee: Habeas Corpus Reform 
Dear Lee: 
At the January 22 hearing of the Federal Courts Study Committee in 
Dallas you mentioned that the Committee would like some statement 
from the Powell Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital 
Cases. 
You will recall that in my presentation I had addressed the habeas 
corpus section of the Study Committee's December 22, 1989 draft. I 
urged recognition of the essential distinction between capital habeas 
and other habeas cases and recommended that your Committee favorably 
consider the Powell report. 
You will remember from the September 1989 Judicial Conferenc 
proceedings that the Powell Committee has been discharged. 
Consideration of its report by the Judicial Conference was postponed 
until March 1990. 
I am enclosing for you, and for Judge Weis , Mr. Harrell and Mr. 
Slate, a copy of the Powell report. Please note the explanation 
after each section of the proposed statute. The reporter for the 
Powell Committee was Professor Albert M. Pearson; his address is The 
University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia 30602 (Ph: 404/542-5187 or 
542-4241). However, I feel certain that any member of the Powell 
Committee would be glad to discuss the report if asked. 
As I pointed out at the January 22 hearing the American Bar 
Association funded a Task Force on Capital Habeas which made 
recommendations which will be considered by the ABA House of 
Delegates at the mid-winter meeting in February 1990 in Los Angeles. 
The ABA report differs in important respects from the Powell report. 
I served on both the ABA Task Force and the Powell Committee; I 
support the recommendations of the Powell Committee. 
- -
I will not abbreviate_. what is already well summarized in the Powell 
report but I respectfully suggest that the study Committee needs to 
at least recognize the following principles regarding habeas corpus: 
(1) there is a fundamental difference in the dynamics of death 
penalty habeas and other habeas; 
(2) there is currently a gap at the state habeas level in 
providing competent counsel for death penalty defendants. 
Competent and reasonably compensated counsel at every stage of 
death penalty proceedings is fundamental. 
(3) the need for an automatic stay of execution upon the filing 
of a capital habeas application in federal district court and an 
automatic appeal without a certificate of probable cause in such 
cases. 
(4) the need for a reasonable statute of limitations on capital 
habeas proceedings provided that limitations will run only when 
a death penalty defendant is represented by counsel. 
(5) that a capital defendant is entitled to one, but only one, 
full and unhurried consideration of his federal habeas claim by 
the federal courts, except in extraordinary situations relating 
to last minute evidence of factual innocence. 
Paraphrasing the Powell Committee, the current chaos in death penalty 
litigation -- periodic inactivity and last minute frenzied activity, 
scheduling and rescheduling of execution dates -- diminishes public 
confidence in the criminal justice system. I believe the Study 
Committee should take note of this situation even if it does not deem 
it appropriate to endorse the Powell Committee Report. 
Thank you for the opportunity to comment. 
Encl. 
cc w/Encl.: Honorable Joseph F. Weis, Jr. (3rd Cir/Philad) 
Mr. Morris Harrell 
Mr. William K. Slate, II (FCSC) 
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review o1:e disposition of grievances .. . iy a person or entity not under the 
direct supervisions or direct control of the institution" (emphases added). 
Under the committee proposal, the prisoner would be required to 
exhaust state administrative remedies as long as a federal court decided that 
the remedies provided by the state were both "fair and effective" without 
resort to any minimum standards. From a legal and pragmatic perspective, 
the failure of a state administrative remedy to contain any one of the minimal 
standards delineated in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e would appear to be fatal to a 
judicial finding that the remedy in question is fair and effective," when the 
administrative litigation must occur with context and confines of an adult 
correctional facility. The absence of any one of the present statutory 
minimum standards or its substantial equivalent would undoubtedly deprive 
the state prisoner of an "opportunity to fully and fairly litigate" his claim in 
the state's administrative process. 
In the event that any change in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e is warranted, the 
committee should recommend only that, where the state administrative 
remedy is not "in substantial compliance" with the minimum standards of 42 
U.S.C. Sec. 1997e (b), there will be a rebuttable presumption that the 
administrative remedy is not "plain, speedy, and effective." To overcome this 
presumption, the state will be allowed to persuade either a federal court or the 
Attorney General that its remedy contains alternate procedures which 
accomplish the same objectives as those addressed by the minimum standards 
and is, in fact, a "plain, speedy, and effective" administrative remedy which 




Habeas corpus petitions, particularly those from state prisoners, 
constitute a substantial portion of the federal courts' caseload. The 537 habeas 
corpus petitions filed in 1945 grew to 9,867 in 1988 - an increase of 1,840 
~
percent. The Committee, however, does not propose any major changes in ~ 
the law or procedure of habeas corpus, in part because Congress is currently~ 
?It~ 
considering the recommendations of the Judicial Conference's Ad Hoc 1. e 
Committee on Habeas Corpus Review of Capital Sentences and the American 








1 OF DELEGATES WILL CONSIDER THE REPORT FEB. 12-13.) Congress's response to those 
2 recommendations may have an effect beyond death penalty cases. 
3 
4 DOES THE COMMITTEE WANT TO HIGHLIGHT ANY THINGS FOR CONGRESS TO CONSIDER--e.g., 
5 ELIMINATING TIME-CONSUMING PROCEDURAL HURDLES, REQUIRING RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN NON-DEATH 
6 PENALTY CASES? 
7 While eschewing major proposals, the Committee has three ------8 recommendations of a less sweeping nature: 
~
9 1. Congress should make no change regarding the standards for hearing 
1 0 state prisoners' successive habeas corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 
-...-:CSIP'lµ;,- .,. .... 
1 1 Sanders v. United States (1963) established the present rules governing 
1 2 the hearing of successive petitions. Under Sanders, federal courts may give 
~
1 3 controlling weight to the geni~ of a prior habeas corpus application only if (1) 
,' 
1 4 the same ground was presented and decided adversely to the petitioner, (2) (-_ 
1 5 the prior decision was on the merits, and (3) reaching the merits of the 
1 6 subsequent application would not serve "the ends of justice." When grounds 
1 7 could have been but were not raised in an earlier petition, the court must 
1 8 reach the merits unless the petitioner has deliberately abused the writ or 
1 9 motion remedy. These rules have been controversial from their inception. 
2 0 Legislative efforts to overrule Sanders failed in 1966. Instead Congress 
2 1 codified Sanders's holding in 28 U.S.C. § 2244. A later effort to overrule -
2 2 Sanders by rule was similarly unsuccessful, and the Court has rejected 
2 3 suggestions to change the decisional law. 
2 4 The Committee believes that n~. Efforts to change 
2 5 the rules reflect an unfounded concern that they have created a flood of 
2 6 successive petitions that needlessly undermine state interests in the finality 






















it does not appear that the federal courts have great difficulty disposing of 
them. They usually dispose of successive petitions summarily and without 
reported opinion, apparently applying the rules as if they incorporated a res 
judicata principle. Courts thus turn aside successive unmeritorious petitions 
, 
routinely without significant expenditure of judicial effort. At the same time, 
the broad formulation in terms of "abuse of the writ" and "the ends of 
justice" provides· judges with sufficient flexibility to reach the merits in those 
cases that do appear to warrant further examination. Finally, the Supreme 
Court last year eliminate~~~~f~!!,~!ve~i!!.9ns --
changes in law that give rise to new claims or strengthen or revive old ones 
✓ ✓ ' . 
(Teague v. Lane and Penry v. Lynaugh). In §3, below, we propose that 
( ·· 1 2 Congress codify and clarify these decisions. 
( 
\ 
1 3 2. Congress should make no change in the law respecting fact-finding 
1 4 procedures in habeas corpus cases. 
1 5 The Committee also examined proposals to restrict further district 
1 6 courts' authority to hold evidentiary hearings in habeas cases. Townsend v. 
1 7 Sain (1963) established when courts must hold evidentiary hearings to make 
1 8 independent fact findings in habeas corpus cases. In 1966, Congress amended 
1 9 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to establish new guidelines for when state court findings 
2 0 should be presumed correct. Opponents of the current law believe that 
2 1 federal courts are wasting valuable time holding hearings to find facts that 
2 2 the state courts have already found. They have proposed restricting federal 
2 3 evidentiary hearings to those few cases in which the state court hearing was 
2 4 not "full and fair," or abolishing federal fact-finding altogether and making 








1 Such changes are unnecessary because, as a factual matter, federal 
2 courts hold evidentiary hearings in very few habeas corpus cases. In both 
3 1987 and 1988, only 1.1 percent of the petitions filed were terminated after a 
4 trial. Habeas corpus cases are less likely than other civil cases to go to trial 
5 because most judges grant a hearing only if the state court proceedings were 
6 not full and fair. The data suggest that this is a direct result of the 1966 
7 amendments. Accordingly, we see little need for congressional intervention. 
8 3. Congress should codify IN §2254(0)(1)? and clarify recent Supreme Court 
9 decisions involving the retroactive use of n!w--~ corpus 
1 0 petitions. -----~ --
1 1 Retroactivity has been particularly sensitive in habeas corpus: If the 
1 2 state provided procedures that protected a defendant's constitutional rights as 
1 3 then understood, but a federal court later decides that the Constitution 
1 4 requires new or different procedures, should the state be required to release 
1 5 the prisoner and hold a second trial that complies with the new law? 
{_ ~ . In 1989, the S~urt dramatically changed the law, holding that 
e,J..~ prisoners ~ seek h~beas corpus relief based on changes in law 
...,,.,... __.. - - '--
1 8 occ~riI;S~!~~~~~-~~!ons. (Teague v. Lane and Penry v. Lynaugh). 








• "new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be _/ ~ --------~-~ ----.. === -
a~!~~~~ -~:':.:..~~~~J:~~ b_efore !he 
new rules are announced." 
-~.,_,,• '-- ~ ,,."I...,-~' 
a rule is "new" if it was not "dictated by prior precedent" -- even 
if the rule was already followed in every state. (A "new rule," 
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Supreme Court at the time the petitioner's conviction becomes 
final.) 
retroactivity is a threshold inquiry that the court must address 
before it considers the merits; 
there are two exceptions to the general prohibition: a petitioner 
may base a claim on "new law" if the claim is (1) that certain 
conduct or a certain kind of punishment is beyond the authority 
of the criminal law to proscribe, or (2) that the absence of a 
particular procedure substantially diminishes the likelihood of 
an accurate verdict. 
1 1 The Committee recommends that Congress codify these decisions but ------.....-----------·~ --,,-~.........-
1 2 clarify certain ambiguities in the law they made, and add a third exception to 
1 3 the two recognized by the Court. Congress successfully codified several then-
1 4 recent Supreme Court habeas decisions in 1966; congressional action will be 
1 5 equally helpful now. 
1 6 Specifically, the Committee recommends that Congress: 
1 7 a. authorize federal courts to hear a habeas corpus petition only if it presents a -
1 8 claim that was either contr.olled or "dearly foreshadowed" by existing 
1 9 Supreme Court precedent. 
2 0 Teague and Penry rest on the premise that the interests of the prisoner 
2 1 are at their weakest, and those of the state at their strongest, when the state 
2 2 courts correctly applied law that was good at the time, even if it is good no 
2 3 longer. The state courts did all that could fairly be asked of them by properly 
2 4 applying the law as it stood during the trial and appeal. According to this 








1 federal habeas proceeding will deter state courts from ignoring federal 
2 constitutional rights; to expect otherwise is to assume that the threat of a 
3 habeas proceeding will prompt courts to foresee a change in the law. 
4 It may be sensible in principle to limit habeas corpus to claims that the 
5 state courts had incorrectly applied existing law. But it is not easy in practice 
6 to distinguish between · "misreading existing law" and "making new law." 
7 The Committee believes the "clearly foreshadowed" standard will encourage 
8 state courts to attend to case law developments as part of their duty to 
9 interpret the Constitution faithfully. On the other hand, it will not penalize 
1 0 them in habeas proceedings for failing to be prescient. We are confident that 
1 1 the courts will be able to administer this standard, even though its precise 
1 2 contours will require further development through adjudication. 
1 3 b. leave to the court's discretion whether to address the merits of the claim, 
1 4 depending on whether they can be separated from the retroactivity question. 
1 5 It will often be difficult to separate the retroactivity issue from the merits. In 
1 6 addition, the issues in habeas petitions are often not clearly formulated 
1 7 because the pleadings are usually prepared by the inmate. Issues that have 
1 8 been formulated clearly by the time the case reaches the Supreme Court are 
1 9 seldom so in the lower courts. 
2 0 c. in addition to the two exceptions announced by the Court, also except from 
2 1 the general prohibition the kind of claim that is not feasible to raise in an 
2 2 appeal from the judgment under which the applicant is in custody. Some 
2 3 claims are unlikely to be raised on direct appeal, for example, claims of 















1 withheld evidence before trial. After Teague and Penry, however, such 
2 claims can no longer be raised in habeas corpus proceedings if they argue for a 
3 change in the law. An exception to the rule of retroactivity is thus needed 
4 here for the same reason the Supreme Court has recognized an exception to 
5 the mootness doctrine for claims that are "capable of repetition yet evading 
6 review." 
7 REFERENCES: 
8 Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989) 
9 Sanders v. U.S., 373 U.S. 1 (1963) 
1 0 Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989) 
1 1 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) 
















For further analysis, see Part HI at 
E. The Chief Justice and the Chair of the Conference of Chief Justices 
should create a National State-Federal Judicial Council. 
136-137 
The Committee endorses the suggestion of the Chair of the Conference 
of Chief Justices for the creation of a national State-Federal Council, composed 
of an equal number of state and federal judges, to study and submit 
recommendations to ease friction and promote cooperative action between 
the two court systems. Areas in which it might offer recommendations are 
readily apparent. Our proposals above, for example, hardly exhausted the 
problems created by complex litigation that presents claims concurrently in 
several federal and state courts. Problems of trial scheduling often create 
friction. Attorney discipline in state and federal courts is often uncoordinated. 
( 2 8 These are but a few of the areas in which the proposed council might offer 
-COMMITIEE DRAFI' 
FCSC REPORT 
• 31 CHAPfER II 
1/30/~ 
1 recommendations in the interests of healthy judicial federalism. 
2 Implementation of such projects might be of interest to the State Justice 
3 Institute in keeping with the Congressional intention in establishing the 
4 Institute. 
5 
6 ORIGINAL TEXT FEATURE A HABEAS EXAMPLE, SUMMARIZED BELOW. I SUGGEST USING THOSE ABOVE 
7 INSTEAD, GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE HABEAS DISCUSSION ANO RECOMMENDATIONS IMMEDIATELY 
8 PRIOR. 
9 
1 0 For example, the council might recommend that Congress 
1 1 provide for review of state prisoners' habeas corpus petitions by 
12 the appropriate United States Court of Appeals immediately 
1 3 after completion of the state appellate process, rather than 
1 4 requiring the petitioner to first seek certiorari in the United 
1 5 States Supreme Court, or to submit the legal issues to the district 
1 6 court. Or it might recommend that state legislatures or supreme 
1 7 courts impose a form of post-conviction review immediately 
(,-
1 8 following the conclusion of the trial and sentencing to create a r 
1 9 program of unitary review in the trial court. 
2 0 Obviously, the Committee takes no position on either of 
2 1 these proposals 
22 
2 3 REFERENCES: 
24 
2 5 In Part n, see also: 
26 
2 7 For further analysis, see Part Ill at 
28 
29 
3 0 ADDIDONAL REFERENCES: 
3 1 
3 2 See Chapter m, §C. (38-40), which proposes to shift railway workers' 
3 3 injury cases from the federal courts to state administrative 




February 5, 1990 
Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas 
Dear Chief: 
Although our Committee was discharged (happily), I 
understand that the report of the ABA Committee will be con-
sidered by the Judical Conference in March. 
I enclose a copy of Judge Barefoot Sanders' letter 
of Janaury 29, to Levin Campbell. It is a helpful letter, 
and I am glad that copies were sent to the members of the 
Campbell Commitee. 





February 6, 1990 
Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus 
Dear Barefoot: 
Thank you for the copy of your letter of January 
29, to Chief Judge Campbell. You were thoughtful to write 
him and send copies of our Report to the members of his com-
mittee. 
The ABA report differs in important respects from 
our Report. I would not have joined it, and am glad that 
you share my view. 
I repeat that you have been a thoughtful and help-
ful member of the Ad Hoc Committee that has now been dis-
charged. I have enjoyed the opportunity to know you. 
Sincerely, 
Hon. Barefoot Sanders 
United States District Court 
Northern District of Texas 
1100 Commerce Street 




... - -UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
TENTH CIRCUIT 
POST OFFICE Bo x 1767 
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA 73101 12 ff.B 1990 
___...t.......-
WILLIAM J , HOLLOWAY, JR. TE L EPHONE 
405 / 231 -4866 
FTS 736·5576 
CHIEF JUDGE 
February 9, 1990 
Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice, Retired 
Supreme Court of the United States 
1 First Street, NE 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
Several of us on the Conference have further studied the 
habeas corpus reform proposals since the September Conference. 
We have drafted a proposed Resolution stating views we have 
formed as to suggested modifications on the statutory 
proposals. We have tried to express this with deference and 
respect to you and your distinguished Committee, and with full 
realization of the diligent efforts you devoted to your 
important Committee work. We trust that we have expressed 
these suggestions in respectful and reasonable terms. 
We want to submit this Resolution for your information, 
and I therefore am enclosing a copy . 
Respectfully, 
~ 
William J. Holloway, Jr. 
WJH:bp 






IN RE: POWELL AD HOC COMMIT'l"EE ON HABEAS CORPUS 
INVOLVING CAPITAL CASES 
The Judicial Conference of the United States endorses the 
essential objectives of the Powell Committee Ad Hoc Report on federal 
habeas corpus review of capital cases: 
(1) to eliminate piecemeal appeals; 
(2) to provide an automatic stay in capital cases in 
order to obviate successive petitions for stay; and 
(3) to provide competent counsel on state post-
conviction cases. 
The Judicial Conference endorses the recommendations of the 
Powell Committee Report subject to the following modifications: 
A. Because many of the delays in habeas corpus procedures are 
related to the fact that the defendant was not represented by 
c~~t ~ counsel at the trial level (as well as in the state post-
conviction proceedings), specific mandatory standards similar to those 
----- ---- ....... ~ - .......___ '" "'\,...,--...·'I.-'--
set forth in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 should be required with 
respect to the appointment and compensation of counsel for capital 
defendants at all stages of the state and federal capital punishment 
~ ----------- -~ 
litigation. 
Upon the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 
federal court the court should first determine whether the specific 
guidelines for competent counsel were followed in the state 
proceedings. If the court determines that competent counsel was 
appointed in the state proceedings, the same counsel should be 
appointed in the federal court, wherever possible. If the court 
determines that competent counsel was not appointed in the state 
proceedings, the federal district court should appoint new counsel 
under the governing guidelines. In the latter case, the federal court 
should not require dismissal of non-exhausted state claims, or apply 
any procedural default rules or the rule governing the presumption of 
correctness of state court findings of fact. 
f' 
• ; - -
COMMENTARY 
The present proposal of the Powell Committee provides states with 
the option to set standards of competency for the appointment of 
counsel in state post-conviction cases. This proposal has serious 
drawbacks. Providing states the option to set and comply with the 
standards will lead to the creation of different and inconsistent 
standards among the states and will result in two sets of procedures 
in federal post-conviction cases: one for petitioners from states 
that have opted to adopt standards and another for petitioners from 
states that do not. The result would be confusion and a proliferation 
~ 
of litigation. We thus endorse the ABA Task Force recommendation of 
~
one mandatory national standard governing competent counsel. 
B. The Conference endorses the following recommendation of the 
ABA Task Force, except substituting the language at the conclusion of -~-, 
this paragraph for the phrase "result in a miscarriage of justice." 
Task 
Federal courts should not rely on state procedural bar 
g,k,s, to preclude conside r at io n of tne me r its of a- claim 
if the prisoner shows that the failure to raise the claim 
in a state court was due to the ignorance of the prisoner, 
or the neglect or ignorance of counsel, or if the failure 
to consider such a claim would undermine the court's 
confidence in the jury's determination of guilt on the 
offense or offenses for which the death penalty was 
imposed, or in the appropriateness of the sentence of 
death. 
c. The conference supports the essential features of the ABA 
~ '- - -
Force recommendation concerning second or successive petitions ---- -for habeas relief. -------- The Conference does, however, favor and endorse a change in that recommendation so that it be clear that it supports a 
~~ ' - .... -
federal court entertaining a second or successive petition on the - ..... ........,_""'- ,,. .-., .... 
grounds stated in the ABA Task Force recommendation, but in addition 
stating that any statutory revision would include a proviso that such 
a successive or second petition be entertained where the facts, if 
proven, would undermine the court's confidence also in nthe 
appropriateness of the sentence of death." In order to make this clear 
within the context of the ABA Task Force recommendation, the 





~ , - -
A federal court should entertain a second or successive ~-- - ~---- --P.,tlJtiQ.!_1 fo ~ hapeas corpus relief if: the reques t: for 
relief is based on a claim not previously presented by the 
prisoner in the state and federal courts and the failure 
to raise the claim is the result of state action in 
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 
States, the result of Supreme Court recognition of a new 
federal right that is retroactively applicable, or based 
on a factual predicate that could not have been discovered 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence; or the facts 
underlying t ·he claim would be sufficient, if proven, to 
up_si_~ in$ ~ ~h ~ .,. cqurt' s ... ~~p~e .... ~in the jury's 
determination of guilt on the offense or offenses for 
which the death penalty was imposed, or in the 





D. The federal statute of limitations should commence upon 
the conclusion of all direct state appeals and state post-conviction 
proceedings, and after the date of judgment on petitions for 
certiorari timely filed after the final state court decision on post-
conviction relief. The federal statute of limitations should be one 
year following the conclusion of proceedings as specified herein. 
E. The Judicial Conference adopts the following 
recommendation of the ABA Task Force: 
The standard for determining whether changes in federal 
constitutional law should apply retroactively should be 
whether failure to apply the new law would undermine the 
court's confidence in the jury's determination of guilt on 
the offense or offenses for which the death penalty was 
imposed, or in the appropriateness of the sentence of 
death. 
Respectfully Proposed, 
/r~ G ~ 









Patricia M. Wald _,,..... ,, '· 
James L. Oakes _,,,, 
1 
• ) 
A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. (t:r-?:3 
Sam J. Ervin, III ,,..~ 
Donald P. Lay ( i;1-Jfa'} · " 
Alfred T. Goodwin ._ , ... ~ ~ .. -.1.'--
William J. Holloway, Jr. 
Frank A. Kaufman ... L 1 t../4,;i,. . 
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ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS 
WASHINGlDN, D.C. 20544 
February 12, 1990 
WILLIAM R. BURCHILL, JR. 
G ENERAL COUNSEL 
MEMORANDUM TO THE MEMBERS OF THE FORMER AD HOC 
COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES 
In order to keep you continuously informed on developments in the wake of the 
Committee's report last fall, Judge Clark has asked me to transmit the following 
materials reflecting recent events: 
1. A resolution adopted by the Conference of Chief Justices at 
their meeting earlier this month, supporting the proposal of the Ad 
Hoc Committee, urging enactment of the pending bill embodying it 
(S. 1760), and opposing the majority report of the American Bar 
Association Criminal Justice Section on the basis that it ''would 
effectively increase rather than reduce delay in capital cases." 
2. A proposed resolution transmitted to the Chief Justice last week 
by Judge Lay with the signatures of seven other Judicial Conference 
members, which states that it "endorses the essential objectives of 
the Powell Committee Report" but with certain modifications as 
enumerated in the proposed resolution. - - - ----· · 7 -~ 
The Ad Hoc Committee's report remains on the agenda of the Judicial 
Conference for its next scheduled meeting on March 13. 
Attachments 
A TRADITION OF SERVICE TO THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
- -
RESOLUTION XVIII. 
HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES 
WHEREAS, the Conference of Chief Justices has long supported 
legislation that would place reasonable limits on 
federal habeas corpus review of state convictions, 
including capital cases; and, 
WHEREAS, abuse of ! the writ encouraged by present practices 
places heavy burdens on the resources of both state 
and federal courts and has effectively negated the 
law of the 37 states that impose the death penalty; 
and, 
WHEREAS, the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in 
Capital Cases of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States (the Powell Committee) has proposed 
amendments to federal habeas procedures that would 
promote finality in capital cases without jeopard-
izing the rights of persons with a colorable claim 
of factual innocence; and, 
WHEREAS, legislation to implement the report of the Ad Hoc 
Committee has been introduced in the U.S. Senate 
NOW, 
as S.1760, · 
THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Conference of Chief 
Justices supports enactment of S.1760 and opposes 
proposals such as S.1757 and the majority report of 
the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section 
that would effectively increase rather than reduce 
delay in capital cases. 
Proposed by the Conference of Chief Justices State-Federal 
Relations Committee at the. 13th Midyear Meeting in San Juan, 
Puerto Rico on February 1, 1990. 
ft 612 290 3309 
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
EIGHTH C:11'CUIT 
,., o. • ox 'tHOI 
•T. ,.AUL, MJNNISOTA • 1171 
February a, 1990 
The Honorable William H. Rehnquist, Chiet Justice 
The Supreme Court of the United states 
l First Street, NE 
Washington, o.c. 20543 
Re: Powell Committee Report - Habeas Corpus Reform Act 
Dear Mr. Chief Justice: 
P.2 
Several weeks ago, a cross-sectional steering committee was 
organized among members of the Judicial Conference to attempt to 
work out some type ot resolution which would endorse the essential 
aspects of the Powell Committee Report with slight modifications. 
The steering committee respectfully requests that this resolution 
be placed on the agenda of the Judicial conference for discussion 
and vote. The resolution is being circularized to all members of 
the Conference. The primary goal of the steering committee is to 
see it we can reach agreement on adequate language which could ~e 
basically endorsed by the Conference as a whole. The purpose in 
circularizing this in advance is to see if we can avoid any debate 
or controversy over any ot the provisions. We have not attempted 
to work out specific language but simply address certain area 
subject matters·. 
We · hope everyone will review our proposal with the 
understanding that the com:mittaa is simply trying in good faith to 
reach an agreement that will basically endorse the original Powell. 
Committee Report with slight modifications. we would appreciate 
any further suggestions or amendments. 
If you have any questions concerning the report, I hope you 
will feel free to write to me or any member ct the steering 
committee. 
Sincerely yours, 
DONALD P. lAY 
DPL/ja 
cc: Hon. Patricia M. Wald 
cc: Hon. James L. Oakes 
cc: Hon. A Leon Higginbotham, Jr. 
cc: Hon. Alfred T. Goodwin 
cc: Hon. William J. Holloway, Jr. 
cc: Hon. Frank A. I<aufman. 
B 612 zg0 330g 
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RESOLUTION 
IN RE: POWELL AD HOC COMMITTEE ON HABEAS CORPUS 
INVOLVING CAPITAL CASES 
P.3 
The Judicial conference ot the united. States endorses the 
essential objectives ot the Powell Committee Ad Hoc Report on 




to eliminate piecemeal appeal&1 
to provide an automatic stay in capital cases 
in order to obviate successive petitions for 
stay1 and 
to provide competent counsel on state post-
conviction cases. 
The Judicial Conference endorses the recommendations of the 
Powell committee Report subject to the following modifications: 
A. Because many ot the delays in habeas corpus procedures are 
related to the fact that the defendant was not represented by 
competent counsel at the trial level (as well as in the state post-
conviction proceedings), specific mandatory standards similar to 
those set forth in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 should be 
required with respect to the appointinent and compensation of 
counsel tor capital defendants at all stages of the state and 
federal capital punishment litigation. 
Upon the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 
the federal court the court should first determine whether the 
specific guidelines for competent counsel were followed in the 
FEB 09 '90 11:22 CI, EXECUTIVE - ST~ - P.4 
atate proceedings. It the court determinaa that competent counsel 
was appointed in the state proceeding•, the • ame counsel should be 
appointed in the federal court, wherever possible. If the court 
determines that competent counsel was not appointed in the state 
proceedings, the federal diatrict court should appoint new counsel 
under the governing guidelines. In the latter case, the federal 
court should not require dismissal of non-exhausted •tate claims, 
or apply any procedural detault rules or the rule governing the 
presumption of correctness of state court findings of fact. 
COKMBHTllY 
The present proposal of the Powell Committee provides states 
with the option to set standards of competency for the appointment 
of counsel in state post-conviction cases. This proposal has 
serious drawbacks. Providing states the option to set and comply 
with the standards will lead to the creation of different and 
inconsistent standards among the atatea and will result in two sets 
of procedures in federal post-conviction cases: one for 
petitioners from states that have opted to adopt standards and 
another for petitioners from atatea that do not. The result would 
be confusion and a proliferation of litigation. We thus endorse 
the ABA Task Force recommendation of one mandatory national 
standard governing competent counsel. 
-2-
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B. The Conference endorses the following recommendation of 
the ABA Task Force, except •Ul:)stituting the language at the 
conclusion of thi• paragraph for the phrase "result in a 
miscarriage of juatice."· 
Federal courts should not rely on •tate procedural bar 
rules to preclude consideration of the merit• ot a claim 
if the prisoner shows that tha failure to raise the claim 
in a state court was due to the ignorance of the 
prisoner, or the neglect or ignorance of counsel, or if 
the failure to consider auch a claim would undermine the 
court's confidence in the jury's determination ot guilt 
on the offense or offenses for which the death penalty 
was imposed, or in the appropriateness of the sentence 
of death. 
c. The Conference supports the essential features of the ABA 
Task Force recommendation concerning second or successive petitions 
tor habeas relief. The Conference does, however, favor and endorse 
a change in that recommendation so that it be clear that it 
supports a federal court entertaining a second or successive 
petition on the grounds • tated in the ABA Task Force 
recommendation, but in addition stating that any statutory revision 
would include a proviso that •uch a successive or second petition 
be entertained where the tacts, it proven, would undermine the 
court's contidence also in "the appropriateness of the sentence of 
death." In order to make this clear within the context of the ABA 
'l'ask Force recommendation, the Conference supports the following 
modified recommendation: 
A federal court should entertain a second or successive 
petition for habeas corpus relief if: the request for 
relief is based on a claim not previously presented by 
the prisoner in the state and federal courts and the 
-3-
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failure to raise the claim is the result of state action 
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 
states, the result of Supreme Court recognition of a new 
federal right that is retroactively applicable, or based 
on a tactual predicate that could not have been 
diaeovered through th• exercise of rea• onable diligence; 
or the facts underlying the claim would be sutficient, 
it proven, to undermine the court•• confidence in the 
jury•• determination of guilt on the oftenae or offenses 
for which the death penalty wa• impo•ad, or in the 
appropriateness of the aentenc• ot death. 
P.6 
o. 'l'he federal statute ot limitation• should commence upon 
the conclusion of all direct atate appeals and state poat-
conviction proceedings, and after the date of judgment on petitions 
for certiorari timely filed after the final state court decision 
on post-conviction relief. The federal statute of limitations 
should be one year following the conclusion o! proceedings as 
specified herein. 
E. The Judicial Conference adopts the following 
recommendation of the ABA Task Force: 
The standard for determining whether changes in federal 
constitutional law should apply retroactively should be 
whether failure to apply the new law would undermine the 
court's confidence in the jury's deterinination of guilt 
on the offense or o!tensea tor which the death penalty 
~as imposed, or in the appropriateness of the sentence 
ot death. 
Respectfully proposed, 
Hon. Patricia M. Wald 
Hon. James L. Oakes 
Hon. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. 
Hon. Sam J. Ervin, III 
Hon. Oonald P. Lay 
Hon. Altred T. Goodwin 
Hon. William J. Holloway, Jr. 
Hon. Frank A. Xaufman 
-4-
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~~bru~rv 13 , 1Q90 
PE'R.SO~AL 
Dear A.narew : 
I have rea<l with interest a draft (I think a final 
c1raft) of the letter from tba Attorney General's office to 
Senator Bid~n on the suhiect of the pending bills proposinq 
changes in federal habeas corpuB ceview . 
My understanding is that you had a hand in prepar-
1nq tne letter . 'I'i1e letter was extremely well written, and 
it pleases me to ~ee such high quality ln support of the 
,ecommenda t ions of the Ad Hoc Committee appoi nte('1 bv the 
Chief Juqtice . In the event you may not hav~ seen it , 
enclos~ d copy of a draft report by a committee of judges 
chnlred by Judge Holloway . Perhapn you have seen the memo 
that Hew wrote me about tne alternative bill of Senator Hl-
den . 
WP. miss you hP.re at the Court . J11stice O' Connor 
spcaKs of you as one of thP. DP.at ]aw clerks she has ever 
had . 
Sincerely , 
Andrew McBriae , Esquire 
10) North Carolina Avenue , 
Apartment 202 
Washington , D. c . 20003 
1 .,: p/c., C 
•• .... . o:':li,';J 
cc: The Chief Justice 
c re 
,.;i • ~ . 
R. Hewitt P~te , Esquire 
- -
February 13, 1990 
Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas 
Dear Chief: 
I enclose a copy of Judge Holloway's letter to me 
of February 9, and a copy of a resolution to be submitted to 
the Judicial Conference in March with respect to federal 
habeas corpus. 
The resolution would endorse the "objectives" of 
our Committee, and proposes modifications of several of the 
recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee. 
I also enclose, in the event you may not have it, a 
copy of a letter (possibly a draft) from the Attorney Gener-
al's office to Senator Biden. The letter strongly supports 
approval of our Committee's recommendations. 




cc: R. Hewitt Pate, Esquire 
- -
lfp/ss 02/13/90 HM SALLY-POW 
MEMO TO MICHAEL AND HEW: 
I will give to Mike with this memo a copy of a let-
ter from the President of the American College of Trial Law-
yers enclosing the Report of the Federal Court's Study Com-
mittee chaired by Judge Weis of CA3. 
Apparently the Report contains "some far-reaching 
and controversial recommendations". Please look at the sub-
jects of the recommendations and let me know whether I 
should take a close look at any of them. If recommendations 
are made with respect to federal habeas corpus, I would like 




February 14, 1990 
Ad Hoc Committee on Habeas Corpus 
Dear Bill: 
It was thoughtful of you to send to me and members 
of the Ad Hoc Committee copies of the two resolutions that 
will be before the Judicial Conference on March 13. 
I regret that Judge Lay's resolution has been en-
dorsed by a number of Chief Judges. Judge Roney has been 
giving the subject further study, and may have a proposal. 
Sincerely, 
William R. Burchill, Jr., Esquire 
General Counsel 
Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts 
Washington, D. C. 20544 
lfp/ ss 
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Holloway Group Letter "' 
4 
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~A.-,r '1 '-" '>"7:J,..I"~ --G-c w-~1 
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I have reviewed the proposed "Re;solution" sent to you H/c., 
by Judge Holloway on behalf of a group of judges. The Reso-
lution is misleading in its presentation, and represents 
total rejection of the Ad Hoc Committee approach. In short, 
the Resolution adopts much of the Biden Bill, but goes be-
yond it in certain areas to embrace the ABA proposal: It 
leaves in place all of the benefits to capital litigants, 
such as counsel and an automatic stay of execution. It re-
moves all of the benefits of finality that might make the Ad 
Hoc Committee proposal attractive to the States. 
cally: 
Specifi-
1. Standards for Counsel. The Resolution abandons your 
approach of letting States "opt in" to the new system. 
I/ \ \ 
Rather, there would be one uniform, mandatory requirement of 
appointment of counsel on state habeas in all cases. The 
Resolution adopts the standards for counsel in the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1988, as does the Biden Bill. These will pre-
vent the States from setting standards according to local 
needs, and will impose great expense. The Resolution also 
creates a right to effective assist a nce of counsel in state 
habeas. This would mean a whole new round of litigation on 
attorney competence after the state pos t-conv i cti on stage. 
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state procedural bars would apply, non-exhausted claims 
would not be dismissed as required under Rose v. Lundy, 455 
U.S. 509 (1982), and state court fact findings would not be 
presumed correct as presently required by 28 u.s.c. 
§2254(d). This provision in itself would create enormous 
new expense, piecemeal litigation, and delay. 
2. Procedural Bars. Like the Biden Bill, the Resolu-
tion would do away with state procedural bars in any case 
where the failure to make an objection was due to the "igno-
rance of the prisoner" or the "neglect or ignorance" of ~-------
counsel, or if the failure to consider the merits would "un-
dermine confidence" in guilt or the sentence. This provi-
sion essentially overrules Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 --
(1977), and adopts Justice Brennan's old ~ v. Noia, 372 
U.S. 391 (1963) "deliberate bypass" standard. The ~ 
standard gives no recognition to finality. Indeed, if the 
prisoner's ignorance is a ground for avoiding the bar, it is 
hard to see when a procedural bar could ever be applied. 
This provision again makes the situation far worse, not bet-
ter. It gives prisoners every incentive to "sandbag" and 
withhold claims for later last-minute presentation. It 
makes the trial -- which should be the most important stage 
-- a mere side-show on the way to f e deral habeas. 
3. Successive Petitions. Here the Resolution adopts 
the Biden and ABA proposals to en c ourage more successive 
petitions. Petitions could be br ought for ( 1) any claim 
based on new facts or law; (2) any claim going to guilt or 
~ 
,/,,,,;<. 
c ...... -.., 
fc..~ 
-/O- b•f":JU. f 
,, 
~ , "'-"· d,N..C:.-C... 
... t 1-(. ,. 
•-r-~-
• sentence, that there 
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even if not new. This standard 
will be no limit whatever on 
is so open-ended 
successive peti-
tions. It assures numerous filings in every case. 
4. Statute of Limitations. The Resolution would start 
the statute of 1 imi ta ti ons only after exhaustion of state 
remedies at the conclusion of state collateral review. And 
the limitations period would be expanded to one year, com-
pared to 180 days under the Ad Hoc Committee approach. This 
change abandons the Ad Hoc Committee approach of having the 
limitations period run from the end of state direct appeal, 
but then remain tolled during state post-conviction proceed-
ings. The effect of the Ad Hoc Committee approach (devised 
by Judge Hodges) was to give an incentive to the prisoner to 
• move into the state process, yet not impose any limit on the 
• 
time for actual litigation. The Holloway Resolution would 
eliminate any incentive for the prisoner to move into state 
court -- his incentive would be to delay. In fact, given 
the presence of an automatic stay of execution, and no stat-
ute of limitations during the state habeas proceedings, a 
prisoner under the Holloway Resolution could retain a stay 
forever by refusing to file a state habeas petition. 
Whether this effect is intentional or an instance of sloppy 
lawyering is not clear. 
5 . Retroactivity. The Resolution predictably would 
overrule Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989). But the 
Holloway Resolution would go beyond the Biden Bill and adopt 
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accuracy of sentence must be applied retroactively. In the 
capital context, of course, this means that all new deci-
sions would probably apply retroactively on habeas. This 
not only rejects Justice Harlan's (and your) approach, it 
demands the opposite. This rule is an affront to federal-
state relations, and a subversion of the proper purposes of 
habeas corpus, as discussed in your opinion concurring in 
the judgment in Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 653 (1984). 
Conclusion. The Resolution is not a responsible con-
tribution to the problems of capital habeas, but an attempt - -
to abolish capital punishment . .......___ I doubt that a majority of 
the lower court judges support this resolution, or even know 
that their Chief Judges are particpating in this Resolution 
campaign. If you think that a response is needed, I recom-
mend that you consider the following: (1) transmit copies of 
the Resolution to the Ad Hoc Committee membe r s; (2) discuss 
the Resolution with the Chief; (3) ensure that the Circuit 
and District judges know about this Resolution before the 
Judicial Conference votes on it. This last recommendation 
seems only fair in that the signers of the Resolution de-
manded time to consult with other judges before voting on 
the Ad Hoc Committee Report. 
R.H.P . 
- -
February 15, 1990 
Ad Hoc Committee on Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases 
Gentlemen: 
I received this week the letters and "Resolution" 
from Judge Holloway, Judge Lay, and a number of other feder-
al judges. These judges represent a majority of the Cir-
cuit Chief Judges. Bill Burchill has sent these materials 
to the Ad Hoc Committee members. 
In my view, the Holloway Resolution represents a 
substantial rejection of our Committee's work. Judge Lay's 
statement that he proposes "slight modifications" that will 
avoid controversy, suggests that he has not read carefully 
the Ad Hoc Committee Report~ I enclose a memo concerning 
the Resolution prepared for me by Hewitt Pate. 
I note in contrast that the Conference of State 
Chief Justices has endorsed our Committee's Report and pro-
posal. 
Federal habeas corpus has become the subject of 
pending bills in the Senate (Biden and Thurmond) and other 
proposals. The Biden Bill would expand the use (and abuse) 
of federal habeas. I understand that the Federal Court 
Study Committee, chaired by Judge Weis, also is considering 
this subject. His Committee meets next week. 
In view of all that is now pending I would guess 
that the Judicial Conference, at its meeting in March, will 
defer action pending further study. I am not unhappy that 
our Committee has been discharged. 
The Chief Justice 














1)11icc o t the A,sl'tant -\tt0 rnc y Ge neral 
Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 
Chairman 
Commit tee on the Judiciary 
United States Senate 
Washington, D.C. 20510 
Dear Chairman Biden: 
L .S. Depar-nt of Justice 
Office of Legi slative Affai rs 
t2d., I k~~ - ~ ' 
(_ ~ ~ 
W~shin~rvn . D C 20530 ,.-f ~ (1 






This letter presents the views of the Department of Justice 
on s. 1757, the "Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1989." The 
Department of Justice s t rongly opposes enactment of s. 1757 and 
urges the Congress to consider in its stead the Administration's 
habeas corpu ~ reform propos al s. 
s. 1757, sponsored by Senator Biden, is purportedly designed 
to implement the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee of the 
Judicial Conference on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases 
(the "Powell Committee"), as set out in that Committee's Report 
of August 23, 1989. The Depar tment supports the conclusions and 
recommendations of the distinguished committee chaired by Justice 
Powell, and will shortly o ffer legislation embodying the major 
elements of the Powell Committee's proposal. In contrast, s. 
1757 so far weakens and qualifies the time limitations and 
finality provisions of the Powell Committee proposal as to ensure 
that no State would op t into its coverage. The Powell Committee ' s 
carefully crafted wquid pro quo• of greater finality in exchange 
for the provision of counsel and automatic stay provisions is 
eviscerated bys. 1757. Even more troubling, S. 1757 would 
affirmatively reach out to preclude the application of Supreme 
court precedents in the areas of procedural defaults and 
retroactivity, thus ensuring further confusion, delay, and 
injustice in the capital litigation process. Enactment of s. 
1757 would either result in increased delay and confusion in the 
capital context or no change at all in a situation where state 
laws providing for capital punishment for the most heinous crimes 
are effectively nullified by the present system of repetitive 
habeas corpus review. 
Delay in the review and execution of capital sentences in 
this country has reached crisis proportions. In 1988, 296 
individuals were convicted of first degree murder and sentenced 
to death under the careful procedures outlined by the Supreme 
Court since Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). At the end 
- -
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of 1988, there were over 2,100 state prisoners under sentence of 
death. In that same year, only 11 capital sentences were 
actually carried out. The average delay from time of conviction 
and sentence to time of execution of sentence in 1988 was six 
years and eight months. See United States Department of Justice, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Capital Punishment 1988, at 1. 
Much of this delay is attributable to the successive presentation 
of claims in repetitive petitions for federal habeas corpus. See 
Woodward v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377, 380 (1984) ("A pattern seems 
to be developing in capital cases of multiple review in which 
claims that could have been presented are brought forward--often 
in piecemeal fashion--only after an execution date is set or 
becomes imminent."). Obviously, the present system has the 
effect of substantially undermining the effectiveness of the 
death penalty as both a deterrent and as a retributive expression 
of society's moral outrage concerning the most heinous of 
intentional killings. As Justice Powell put it in his testimony 
before the Committee, "[t)he hard fact is that the laws of 37 
States are not being enforced by the courts." Statement of 
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Retired), November 8, 1989, at 4. 
The Powell Committee procedures, represent the fruits of 
careful study of the problem of delay in capital cases by a 
distinguished panel of jurists who are thoroughly familiar with 
the details of capital litigation. It should be emphasized that 
the Powell Committee proposals afford abundant opportunities for 
capital litigants to develop and raise claims of federal 
constitutional error in their convictions and sentences. Beyond 
trial and direct review, the defendant would typically be 
accorded full review through state post-conviction proceedings 
and one full round of federal habeas corpus proceedings, through 
the district court, the court of appeals, and final review by 
certiorari before the Supreme Court. Under the Powell Committee 
proposal, the capital defendant would be provided with competent 
counsel throughout both federal and state proceedings after his 
or her conviction and sentence had already been affirmed on 
direct appeal. Moreover, a mandatory stay of execution would 
remain in effect throughout this process of collateral review. 
Thus, contrary to the suggestion made by Senator Biden in 
introducing s. 1757, see Cong. Rec. S13473 (Oct. 16, 1989), the 
question is not what procedures will apply to a capital defendant 
who has only "one bite at the apple," but what procedures will 
apply where the defendant has already had numerous "bites at the 
apple," with respect to the same claims, before several different 
courts. 
The provision of counsel and mandatory stay provisions in 
the Powell Committee proposal are balanced by offering the States 
greater finality after this careful capital review process is 
completed. In light of the lengthy review process proposed under 
the Powell Committee's original recommendations, any changes 
considered by Congress should be in the direction of 
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strengthening -- not weakening -- the proposal's time limitation 
and finality rules. The departures of s. 1757 from the original 
Powell Committee proposal, however, are consistently in the 
direction of less finality and less restraint, or in the 
direction of no real restraint at all. Indeed, as both Justice 
Powell himself and Chief Judge Clark made clear in their 
testimony before the Committee, S. 1757 departs in fundamental 
respects from the approach and recommendations of the Powell 
Committee, and offers only the illusion of reform in the face of 
the growing crisis in capital litigation. We detail our concerns 
with specific provisions of S. 1757 below. 
Proposed 28 u.s.c. § 2256 of S. 1757, like the comparable 
provision in the original Powell Committee proposal, states that 
t h e special capital punishment procedures will apply only if the 
state makes appropriate arrangements for appointment of counsel 
in capital cases. However, proposed§ 2256 differs from the 
original Powell Committee formulation in its specification of a 
multi-step procedure in subsection (c) (2) for the unusual case in 
which a prisoner under sentence of death declines appointment of 
counsel for collateral proceedings. s. 1757 contemplates a 
cumbersome procedure in this circumstance, with reso l ution of the 
issues of competency and waiver divided between the trial court 
and the state court of last resort. Competency and waiver are 
quintessentially factual issues to be determined by a trial 
judge, and the provisions of s. 1757 would result in a needless 
shuttling between courts to determine this issue. As Chief Judge 
Clark indicated in his testimony before the Committee, "[t]his 
change creates added expense and consumes time and judicial 
resources." 
Proposed 28 u.s.c. § 2257 ins. 1757, like the corresponding 
provision in the original Powell Committee formulation, provides 
for an automatic stay of execution while litigation continues 
through the final disposition of an initial federal habeas corpus 
petition. However, it departs fundamentally from the Powell 
Committee's approach by substantially undermining the finality 
provisions after one round of both state and federal habeas 
corpus review has been completed. 
As noted above, under the Powell Committee's proposal, a 
capital defendant would be accorded the services of counsel and a 
mandatory stay of execution through one round of federal habeas 
corpus review. To obtain further federal review after that 
point, a defendant would have to show both a clear justification 
for failure to raise the claim in earlier proceedings and that 
the facts underlying the claim, if proven, would undermine the 
court's confidence in the defendant's factual guilt. The 
specific grounds of justification for an earlier failure to raise 
the claim would, in essence, be the unavailability of the legal 
or factual basis for the claim at an earlier point, or state 
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action in violation of federal law that resulted in the earlier 
failure to raise the claim. 
s. 1757 would effectively nullify the effort reflected in 
the Powell Committee proposal to achieve reasonable finality at 
the conclusion of litigation of an initial federal habeas corpus 
petition. Under proposed§ 2257(c) in the bill, newly discovered 
claims, newly recognized rights, and unlawful state action would 
continue to be grounds for allowing claims to be raised in 
successive petitions. However, unlike the Powell Committee's 
proposal, in S. 1757 none of these grounds for raising a claim 
for the first time in a successive federal habeas petition need 
be tied to a colorable claim of factual innocence. Thus, S. 1757 
rejects one of the most important conclusions of the Powell 
Committee. As the Committee's report stated: 
Both the prisoner and his counsel have every incentive 
to ask whether all relevant information in mitigation 
of punishment was presented and whether the sentencing 
phase of the trial was otherwise conducted in a 
constitutionally fair manner. Given the clear 
incentive to do this, the Committee does not believe 
that the federal courts should have to consider a 
second petition under section 2254 which challenges 
only the sentencing phase in a capital case .... 
[T]he only appropriate exception is when the new claim 
goes to the underlying guilt or innocence of the state 
prisoner under capital sentence. 
Powell Committee, Report and Proposal, August 23, 1989, at 17-18. 
By encouraging relitigation of claims arising from the penalty 
phase of capital litigation, and other claims unrelated to the 
guilt or innocence of the defendant, S. 1757 punches a gaping 
hole in the finality provisions of the carefully crafted Powell 
Committee proposal. 
In addition, section 2257(c) (3) of s. 1757 establishes a 
further exception to finality after completion of a first federal 
habeas petition where "a stay and consideration of the requested 
relief are necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice." This 
free floating exception is linked neither to a past inability to 
raise the claim, nor to a situation where the defendant's factual 
innocence may be at stake. Presumably, it could be raised 
successively in a second, third, or fourth federal habeas 
petition, each time with a new variation on an old claim 
constituting the alleged "miscarriage of justice." In our view, 
the exceptions to finality outlined in the Powell Committee 
proposal are fully adequate to ensure that no real miscarriage of 
justice occurs. The undefined "miscarriage of justice" exception 
ins. 1757 only invites abuse, and raises the specter of 
disparate treatment of capital litigants as courts are called 
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upon to give content to this term in the context of last-minute 
stay applications.]J 
Proposed 28 U.S.C. § 2258 in S. 1757 deviates substantially 
from the Powell Committee's proposed time limitations on the 
filing of an initial federal habeas corpus petition. The Powell 
Committee proposal provides for a 180 day filing period, which is 
tolled during state post conviction proceedings, with a 60 day 
extension available for good cause. Under S. 1757, the 
limitations period would be more than doubled to 365 days, 
subject to a possible extension of up to 90 days for good cause. 
Moreover, unlike the Powell Committee proposal, under S. 1757 the 
limitations period would be tolled while a petition for 
certiorari was filed from state collateral proceedings. 
We agree with the conclusion of the Powell Committee that 
the proposed 180 day period "ensures adequate time for the 
development and presentation of claims." Powell Committee, 
Report and Proposal, at 6. As Chief Judge Clark noted in his 
testimony before the Committee, a one-year limitations period 
would do nothing more than codify the present average delay in 
moving from state post-convict i o n to f ederal habeas corpus 
proceedings. Given that the Powell Committee proposal assures 
that capital defendants will have counsel available to 
investigate and frame their legal claims throughout the process, 
codifying the existing level of delay (where inmates often act 
prose or are delayed by difficulty in obtaining counsel) is 
wholly unjustified. 
We also disagree with§ 2258(2) of s. 1757 which would toll 
the statute of limitations while a petition for certiorari was 
pending from state post-conviction proceedings. Given the 
availability of a petition for certiorari both on direct review 
and after one round of federal habeas, this provision would seem 
to add delay simply for delay's sake. The Supreme Court rarely 
grants review of petitions arising from state post-conviction 
proceedings, and, under the Powell Committee proposal, a stay of 
execution would remain in effect until Supreme Court review of a 
]J The Supreme Court has used the term "miscarriage of justice" 
in the context of an exception to the usual rules governing 
procedural defaults. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-
496 (1988). Even in this context, the Court has made it clear 
that a "miscarriage of justice" involves "an extraordinary case, 
where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the 
conviction of one who is actually innocent." Id. at 496. See 
also Harris v. Reed, 109 s. Ct. 1038, 1048 (O'Connor, J. 
concurring). Of course, the Powell Committee proposal itself 
adequately guards against any miscarriage of justice in the sense 
that term is defined by the Supreme Court. 
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petition for certiorari from federal habeas corpus proceedings 
was disposed of. 
Proposed 28 u.s.c. § 2259 of S. 1757 would preclude 
application in the capital context of the rules of procedural 
default for failure to raise federal claims before the state 
courts. In Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), the Supreme 
Court held that a federal court should not entertain a claim in 
federal habeas proceedings which would not be entertained by the 
state courts because of failure to raise the claim in accord with 
state procedural rules. The Court recognized an exception to 
this rule where the defendant could show "cause,"~, a 
persuasive reason for failure to raise the claim in a timely 
manner, and "prejudice,"~, that the constitutional error 
alleged was so fundamental as to infect the entire proceeding. 
See Murray v. Carrier, supra, at 492-494. Without these rules, 
the Court feared that federal habeas proceedings would breed 
disrespect for state procedures, and "encourage 'sandbagging' on 
the part of defense lawyers, who may take their chances on a 
verdict of not guilty in the state trial court with the intent to 
raise their constitutional claims in a federal habeas court if 
their initial gamble does not pay off." Wainwright v. Sykes, 
supra, at 89. 
Under the approach taken by S. 1757, the Wainwright test 
would be inapplicable to capital cases governed by its 
provisions. A district court would be required to consider a 
claim which had not been properly raised in state court if "the 
failure to raise the claim in a State court was due to the 
ignorance or neglect of the prisoner or counsel or if the failure 
to consider such a claim would result in a miscarriage of 
justice." In contrast, the Powell Committee's proposal 
essentially codifies the Wainwright test. 
In our view, s. 1757's abandonment of the well settled 
standards for evaluating procedural defaults is ill-advised, 
particularly in the capital context. No litigants have a greater 
incentive to withhold claims for use in later proceedings than 
capital defendants, for whom delay results in effective 
abrogation of their sentences. Given the fact that under both 
the Powell Committee proposal and S. 1757, capital defendants 
would be provided with counsel throughout trial, appeal, and 
post-conviction proceedings, allowing the "ignorance or neglect 
of the prisoner" to excuse a failure to properly raise a claim in 
state court proceedings seems a positive invitation to abuse. In 
addition, s. 1757 allows a federal court to ignore the failure to 
raise a claim in accordance with state procedures where failure 
to consider a claim would result in a "miscarriage of justice." 
If this provision simply codifies present law in this area, see 
n. 1, supra, it is already covered by the Powell Committee 
proposal. If it is meant to go beyond existing law, it simply 
introduces uncertainty and a further incentive to delay. Under 
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both the Powell Committee proposal and, present law, capital 
defendants are free to raise the claim on federal habeas that 
counsel's ineffectiveness was the "cause" of a procedural 
default. See Murray v. Carrier, supra , at 496. It seems to us 
very unlikely that many States will chose to be governed by the 
regime of s. 1757, which gives capital litigants an incentive to 
ignore the State's own procedural rules for prompt and orderly 
presentation of claims before the state courts . 
Proposed 28 u.s.c. § 2261 of S. 1757 would set specific 
standards of counsel experience for capital cases. In general, 
representation at all stages would normally be limited to counsel 
with five years of bar admission and three years of felony 
litigation experience in the particular courts in which the case 
is being adjudicated. The specified requirements could be waived 
on an ad hoc basis, for good cause, if the court determined that 
other counsel could properly handle the representation. These 
standards are based on the competence standards for counsel under 
the death penalty provisions of t h e Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 
(21 u.s.c. § 848(q) (4)-(10)). 
We believe that the original formulation cf the Powell 
Committee on this issue, which leaves the formulation of 
standards of competency to the state court of last resort or 
state legislation is preferable to the approach taken bys. 1757. 
While some states might wish to define competency in terms of the 
specific experience requirements proposed ins. 1757 and the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act death penalty provisions, it is also obvious 
that there may be other legitimate choices. For example, s. 1757 
refers to bar admission and litigation experience in the 
particular state courts in which the litigation takes place, but 
states may find that bar admission and criminal litigation 
experience in the federal courts or in other state jurisdictions 
is an adequate substitute for this particular experience 
requirement. Or states may find that special training programs 
or certification procedures for counsel involved in capital 
punishment litigation are superior to a straight years-of-
experience requirement, as proposed ins. 1757. In adopting a 
rigid approach, s. 1757 disserves both the interest of defendants 
in having a pool of qualified counsel available for appointment 
and the public interest in ensuring that the litigation of 
capital cases will not be delayed because of the unavailability 
of qualified counsel. 
We are also concerned by proposed§ 2261(d) of s. 1757, 
which abrogates normal rules and standards governing the 
compensation of counsel. Clearly, leaving this issue to the 
unguided determination of individual judges is not the best way 
of ensuring appropriate levels of compensation, and general rules 
governing compensation of counsel -- as illustrated by the 
Criminal Justice Act provisions, 18 u.s.c. § 3006A(d)-(e), for 
federal cases -- may incorporate sufficient flexibility to permit 
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adequate compensation in cas~s of unusual difficulty or 
complexity. The wholesale waiver of normal compensation 
standards under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act death penalty provisions 
(21 u.s.c. § 848(q) (10)) was unwarranted, and the error should 
not be compounded by imposing a like provision on the states. 
Finally, proposed§ 2262 of s. 1757 would overturn the 
Supreme Court's recent decisions in Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 
1060 (1989), and Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989), which 
held that changes i n law are generally not to be applied 
retroactively in c ollateral proceedings. The Court's opinions in 
these cases ended an essentially ad hoc approach to the 
retroactivity of Supreme Court decisions; an approach which 
worked substantial unfairness by treating similarly situated 
litigants differently. See Teague, supra, at 1072 (plurality 
opinion). Teague and Penry complet ed the Court's adoption of an 
approach to retroactivity long advocated by Justices Harlan and 
Powell: all new decisions are presumptively retroactive on direct 
review, and presumpt ively inapplicable to defendants already 
involved in collateral proceedings . This provides a fair and 
workable rule upon which both the States and criminal defendants 
can rely. Moreover , even on collateral review, under TeRgue, a 
decision will be retroactively applied if it absolutely bans the 
punishment of certain conduct or the application of a certain 
punishment, or substantially improves the truth-seeking function 
of the trial process. Thus, as the Court's opinion in Penry 
indicates, fundamental challenges to the application of capital 
punishment may still be retroactive on collateral review. Penry, 
supra, at 2952. 
s. 1757 replaces the improvement in the law worked by Teague 
and Penry with an approach that invites individualized 
determinations of retroactivity guided only by extremely vague 
criteria. This would resurrect all the unfairness and 
uncertainty in the area of retroactivity which the Court 
endeavored to eliminate in Teague. Moreover, it would act as a 
positive detriment to finality, by allowing capital litigants to 
point to even the most trivial changes in Supreme Court precedent 
as grounds for a successive habeas corpus petition. As Justice 
O'Connor noted in her opinion for the Court in Engle v. Isaac, 
456 U.S. 107, 128, n. 33 {1982): "State courts are 
understandably frustrated when they faithfully apply existing 
constitutional law only to have a federal court discover, during 
a [habeas corpus] proceeding, new constitutional commands." In 
our view, it is extremely unlikely that States will elect to be 
governed by the provisions of S. 1757, which perpetuates this 
frustrating state of affairs in the area of retroactivity. 
In sum, s. 1757, is not the Powell Committee's proposal, nor 
does it implement anything resembling the recommendations of the 
Powell Committee. The procedures proposed ins. 1757 would 
generate more, not less, unnecessary delay and confusion in 
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capital litigation. Because S. 1757 offers state court judgments 
in capital cases less finality than they now enjoy, no State 
would choose to operate under its one-sided provisions. The 
Department of justice continues to believe that the Powell 
Committee proposal offers a sound and workable basis for habeas 
corpus reform, and remains eager to work with the Congress in 
strengthening that proposal. s. 1757 represents a step in the 
wrong direction, and, as Justice Powe l l suggested in his 
testimony, its adoption would mean that "an important opportunity 
to provide needed safeguards for inmates, and to bring sanity to 
our system of capital review, will have been lost." Statement of 
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., at 11. 
The Office of Management and Budget has advised that there 
is no objection to the transmittal of this letter from the 
standpoint of the Administration's program. 
Sincerely, 
Carol T. Crawford 
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u.va. Class - Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases 
(Prof. Meador) 
MEMOS. 1757 (the Biden bill) 
This bill (S. 1757) purports to implement the rec-
ommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee. Like our recommenda-
tions, it provides that a state may "opt" (elect) to be gov-
erned by the bill. There are major differences that proba-
bly would deter any state f~om electing to comply with S. 
1757. See the Assistant Attorney General's letter in which 
he states that the Biden bill would result in "increased 
delay and confusion" in capital cases. I am inclined to 
agree with him. 
In Woodward v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377, 380 
(1984)(an opinion I wrote) we noted the way multiple review 
often is obtained in habeas capital cases. I can testify to 
my own experience with piecemeal applications. Sometimes 
there are as many as three the day before an execution. 
Our Committee's Bill 
After trial and direct state review the capital 
defendant would have (i) state post conviction reviews, and 
(ii) one full habeas corpus review through the DC, the CA 
and by cert to the Supreme Court. 
,. • - 2. 
A unique feature of the Ad Hoc bill is that it 
would require a capital defendant to be provided with compe-
tent counsel "throughout both federal and state collateral 
proceedings" after his conviction and sentence had been af-
firmed on direct appeal. Moreover, a mandatory stay of exe-
cution would remain in effect throughout the process of col-
lateral review. Under the Biden bill, the capital defendant 
would have repetitive reviews as at present. 
I note here that the requirement of competent coun-
sel under our proposal applies to the state collateral re-
view. Thus, the new counsel appointed at that time would be 
free to argue ineffective assistance of the trial counsel. 
I should see Chief Judge Charles Clark's testimony 
before the Biden Committee. Apparently he makes clear that 
S. 1757 departs in fundamental respects from the recommenda-
tions of the Ad Hoc Committee. It would in effect prevent 
the enforcement of the laws of 37 states. 
The Biden bill would permit review of the sentence 
in the event of "newly discovered claims, newly recognized 
rights, and unlawful state action." Under the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee's proposal, none of the foregoing grounds would per-
mit a defendant to raise a claim for the first time in a 
successive habeas petition in the absence of a colorable 
claim of factual innocence. Thus, S. 1757 would reject one 
of the more important recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commit-
t, • - 3. 
tee. See the quote from our report on page 4 of the Assist-
ant Attorney General's letter. 
Section 2254(c)(3) of the Biden bill would estab-
lish a further exception to finality. This could occur 
after completion of a first federal habeas review where "a 
stay and consideration of the requested relief are necessary 
to prevent a miscarriage of justice." There is no limiting 
principle as to what constitutes a miscarriage of justice. 
As the Assistant Attorney General's letter notes, this would 
be a "free floating exception" that is linked neither to any 
past inability of the defendant to raise the claim, or to a 
situation where there is a colorable claim of factual inno-
cence. Indeed, under the language of §2257(c)(3) the "mis-
carriage of justice" claim apparently could be raised suc-
cessively in a second, third or fourth federal habeas peti-
tion. 
Filing Period for Post Conviction Proceedings 
The Ad Hoc Committee proposal provides for a 180-
day filing period within which an initial federal habeas 
corpus petition must be filed. This period would be tolled 
during state post-conviction proceedings, with a 60-day ex-
tension for good cause. The Biden limitations period would 
be one year, with a possible extension of up to 90 days. 
Moreover, unlike our proposal, under S. 1754 the limitations 
period would be tolled while a petition for cert is filed 
from state collateral proceedings. 
• - 4 . 
Chief Judge Clark's testimony before the Committee 
correctly noted that the one-year limitations period would 
do no more than codify the present average delay by a de-
fendant moving from state post-conviction to federal habeas 
corpus proceedings. Since our Committee would assure that 
capital defendants will have counsel available throughout 
this period, 180 days seems adequate. 
Rules of Procedural Default 
The Biden bill, in effect, would preclude the ap-
plication in capital cases of the rules of procedural de-
fault. That is, where the oefendant fails to raise federal 
claims before the state court. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 
U.S. 72 (1977) in which we held that a federal court on ha-
beas may not consider a claim that could have been raised in 
state courts but was not - that is, where there was a proce-
dural default. We recognized an exception to this rule 
where the defendant could show "cause" - i.e., a satisfac-
tory reason for failure to raise the claim in a timely man-
ner, and also show "prejudice". The constitutional error 
alleged must be so fundamental that it creates doubt as to 
the fairness of the entire proceedings. 
The Ad Hoc Committee would codify the Wainwright 
test. The Biden bill would substantially change the law, 
resulting in further delay. 
• • - 5. 
Standards of Counsel 
Section 2261 of the Biden bill would set specific 
standards of counsel's experience required in capital cases. 
In general, representation at all stages would be limited to 
counsel with five years of experience after bar admission, 
and three years of felony litigation experience in the par-
ticular courts in which the case is being adjudicated. 
These are standards similar to those for counsel under the 
death penalty provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. 
These, of course, apply to federal cases. 
It is difficult enough to find competent counsel in 
capital cases. Even where the states provide for compensa-
tion, it may be quite inadequate. Also capital cases last a 
long time, and counsel may find far more profitable repre-
sentation. Also the standards Biden would require would 
exclude a good many lawyers with extensive criminal experi-
ence that may not have include any capital cases. 
* * * 
The Biden bill also would nullify Taegue and Penry 
v. Lynaught. 
L.F.P . , Jr. 
ss 
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JACKSON, .,., ..... ,,.,., s••o1 
(VIA FACSIMILE) 
February 22, 1990 ~ 
~1-z..~ 
TO KBMBBRS OP THB AD BOC COIOIITTKB ON FEDERAL HABEAS 
CORPUS RBVIBW OF CAPITAL SBNTERCBS 
Judge Roney and I propose the attached supplementary 
comment be issued by the committee to the Judicial 
Conference in connection with the consideration of the 
committee's report. We continue to feel that the criticism 
which focuees on auccessive petitions directed only to 
sentencing presents the area of most concern to members of 
the Conference. If anyone can think of a structure that 
would allow Bentences to be attacked in successive petition• 
on a limited basis, we may wish to indicate that such an 
amendment would be acceptable. As of now, neither Judge 
Roney nor I can COJlle up with an acceptable formulation. 
Your moat prompt consideration and response would be 
appreciated. Our cOJDll\8nt ahould be a part of the materials 
which go to Conference members on March 5, so we really need 




Justice Lewis r. Powell 
Judqe William Terrell Hodges 
Judge Paul H. Roney 
Judqa Barefoot Sanders 
Professor Albert Pearson 
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SUPPI,!XBJRARY COJOIBJl'l' BY THI AD BOC CODI'l'l'BB OJI 
PBDBRAL BABBAS CORPUS IB CAPITAL CASBS--
'l'IIB P0WBLL CONIUTTBB RBPOR"l 
003 
Sine• our report in September 1989, a number of 
comments, reports, auqqeatione, and recommendation• have 
been circulated. Senator Biden has introduced a bill 
addresalng the subject; the American Bar Association Task 
Force on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus has published it• final 
report and disaents1 and the Federal Court• Study Committee 
has circulated a draft report. Recently, Judge Lay and 
• even other members of the Judicial Conference have 
circulated a resolution proposing apecific modifications of 
the Powell Committee report. 
The members of the Powell Committee have reviewed the 
committee report in light of these development•. We 
conclude that the Conference should adopt th• report without 
any modification•. 
conclusion. 
Th• following comments •upport this 
The overwhelming consensus of those who have studied 
the present situation advocate• cbanqes that would addresa 
fundamental faults in the present procedures. Perceptions 
differ, so do the theory and atructura of proposed 
11olutiona. 
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The Powell Committee report does not purport to cure 
all of the faults in all of the syatema involved. Rather, 
it recommends leqialation designed to achieve a balanced 
com.promiaa which would commit federal court• to a ain;le but 
comprehensive and orderly district and appellate habeas 
corpus proceeding deaiqned to assure fairness to the state 
and the defendant in exchange for state funded counsel for 
petitioners in state collateral procedure. Thia exchange ie 
th• heart of the committee proposal. It recoqnizee that if 
a state is willinq to furnish a petitioner competent counsel 
for state court poat-conviction proceedinq•, thoae 
proceeding• can provide really meaningful collateral review-
-a proceaa now left almoat entirely to federal habeaa 
corpu•• The committee recommendation provides an automatic 
stay of execution until all state collateral and federal 
habeas corpus proceeding• are completed. A time limitation 
would ~eplace the present use of writs of execution to keep 
litigation before the courts. The time limit would cut in 
half the average of one year now lost when no collateral 
proceedings are before any court. 
Habeas corpua reforms are frequently proposed, but 
seldom enacted. Unlasa proposed leqislation balances the 
interests of the atate and the defendant, it will have 
little or no chance of enactment. Our design proposes an 
opt-in compromiso. States must voluntarily implement and 
r .: "', ~.. .,. .. ., 
•,.:r.-.;-.A,. • ., . • • 
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fund a proqram providinq competent counsel and litigation 
coats which !a not conetitutionally compelled. The 
proposals advanced by othere would :mandate coun11el 
standards, take away present procedural riqhta, and overrule 
existing Supreme Court precedent. Imposing these burdens 
will probably nullify any hope of enactment and, if enacted, 
such legislation would surely attract no state cooperation. 
In either event, present faults would continue to plague the 
process. 
The most siqnificant areas of difference between our 
committee report and other proposals area 
Counsel Standards. The Powell Committee recommendation 
provides that atate procedures muet result in the 
appointment of competent counsel. The Biden Bill and Judge 
Lay's group adopt the Anti-Drug Abuae Standards; the ABA 
Task Force adopts the much more complex A.BA Guidelines for 
appointment and qualification of counsel. 
Comments The Powell Committee approach 
leave• counsel atandarda to individual states but 
keeps th• ultimate question of competency in the 
hands of the federal courts. If the procedure• a 
state adopts for appointing counsel are not valid, 
the quidelinea and time limit• do not take effect. 
Rather than saddle the defendant with counsel who 
would meet some pre-fixed requirement but might 
not be competent otherwise, the Committee 
recommends this be left to community standards and 
judicial development. Leqislation has not been 
necessary to implement the constitutional 
definition of "effective assistance of counsel,• 
and it would be counterproductive here. Times 
change more often than atatutea, and a defendant 
is entitled to counsel that meete current notions 
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of coapetency. Experience has shown that capital 
defendants often receive excellent representation 
by counsel who might not fit the ABA or proposed 
drug statute • tandarde. 
006 
Down Time. The Powell Committee require• that a 
federal petition be filed within 180 days of appointment of 
counsel, but this period is tolled whenever the caaa is in 
etate court, and may be supplemented by 60 more days for 
qood cause. Judge Lay's qroup proposes to double the time 
counsel can stay out of court to 365 days. 
Biden proposal• use 365 day• plus 90 days. 
The ABA and 
Comment I Thi• ia a judgment call. Case 
studies show that allowing counsel to stay out of 
court for one year would not shorten present 
delays • In practice, petitions are aometime11 
required to b• filed in a matter of day•, or 
weeks, when an execution date has been set. One 
Hundred Eiqhty days 1• ample. That 111 the time 
approved by the Judicial Conference in 1974. 
Experience proves the wisdom of that decision. 
Th• same counsel serves the defendant in both 
• tate collateral and federal habeas. Ho re-
education or study la needed. Since the proposal 
contemplates full litigation of all iesue• in 
• tate court, the move by the same counael from 
state to federal court should not involve any 
major problem in inveetiqation, preparation and 
drafting. Once the petition is filed in federal 
court, the limitation ends. 
succeesive Habeas Corpu11 Petitions. The Powell 
Committee would permit successive federal litigation only as 
a result of state action in violation of the Constitution, 
when the Supreme court ha• announced a new retroactive 
right, or when alleged facts, if proven, would undermine the 
court's confidence in the jury' • determination of guilt of 
the capital offense. The Biden Bill and ASA Taek li',..,....,.. .... 
I 
l 
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would, in addition, permit further litigation u to any new 
legal predicate. Thie is contrary to present Supreme Court 
precedent on retroactivity. A successive petition would 
also be permitted "if neceeaary to prevent a mi•carriaqe of 
justice." Judqe Lay's group would allow successive 
petitions on the see grounds aa the ABA Task Force plua 
allowing petitioner to attack the appropriateness of the 
sentence. 
Comment a The Powell Comm! ttee opposea 
overrulinq Supreme Court precedent. In effect, 
the Powell Committee proposal would limit the 
"miscarriage of juetice" concept to praventinq a 
state from executing a defendant who could • how 
facts which would undermine the court's confidence 
in the jury's determination of guilt of th• 
capital offenee. The ;eneral "miecarriaqe of 
justice" etandard finds ita definition so largely 
in the eye of the beholder rather than in accepted 
leqal principles as to forfeit the measure of 
federal finality the committee'• proposed 
compromise needa • To broaden thi• exception to 
finality with the Lay qroup'e words •to undermine 
the court's confidence . • • in the 
appropriateness of the sentence of death• would 
open th• door even wider to repetitious 
litigation. Th••• appear to b• new words in the 
federal law of habeas corpus. The co1Dl1litt•• is 
unaware of any decision which permits a federal 
court to qrant con• titutional relief from a state 
death sentence on the qround that th• court does 
not have confidence that the sentence is 
"appropriate." 'l'h• recommendation does not 
reflect whether the federal court would apply a 
state or federal standard of "inappropriateness," 
but the inference ia that a federal standard would 
be used. We cannot imagine that any state would 
opt into a system which opened up this new avenue 
for successive federal litigation. 
In the rare instance where constitutional 
claims affecting the sentence• weren't known until 
fully counseled state and federal proceedinqa have 
. . 
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been exhausted, they can still be presented in 
state court. 
008 - - .. 
The Powell Committee proposal is neither for nor 
against the death penalty. Its eole aim is to improve the 
process of federal habeaa corpus by proposinq a legialative 
compromise that has a realistic chance of beinq adopted and 
implemented. We continue to believe that the Powell 
Committee report in its present form holds the best promise 










Justice Powell February 23, 1990 
Hew ~ /,y 
Draft Ad Hoc Committee Comments. ( ~~~) 
.I\ 
I have received the copy of a p r oposed draft concerning 
new habeas corpus measures sent by Judge Clark. The general 
approach is good. 
tions are needed. 
I think a few clarifications and addi-
Perhaps we can talk about those on Satur-
day. I have the time to write out some proposed comments 
~ 






February 23, 1990 
Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas 
Dear Charles and Paul: 
I received today by "fax" your memorandum for the 
Judicial Conference. I am impressed that you both have con-
tinued to consider the various proposals to make changes in 
death penalty habeas corpus. 
You will not be surprised to know that I find no 
merit in the Biden bill or in the ABA Task Force proposals. 
The Federal Court Study Committee report, only in draft 
form, is consistent with most but not all of our report and 
recommendation. 
I may have some minor language changes to suggest 
in your draft, and will call you on Monday. 
My best to you both. 
Hon. Charles Clark 
Hon. Paul H. Roney 
lfp/ ss 
cc: The Chief Justice 
Sincerely, 
Hon. William Terrell Hodges 
Hon. Barefoot Sanders 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 
William R. Burchill, Jr., Esquire 
- -
February 23, 1990 
Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas 
Dear Chief: 
I will deliver to you a "faxed" letter from Charles 
Clark, together with a "supplementary comment", that would 
go to members of the Judicial Conference on March 5. 
After considerable further study, Judges Clark and 
Roney think the original proposal of our Committee is the 
best of those that have been submitted. I certainly agree 
that the Biden bill and the ABA report could well make the 
situation worse rather than better. 
You may be too busy to give this any thought at 
this time. I will call Charles Clark on Monday and suggest 
some minor language changes. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ ss 
2 7 FEB 1990 - -,niteb jh:des ~istrid <O:our± 
WM. TERRELL HODGES 
JUDGE • 
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE 
TAMPA, FLORIDA 33602 
February 23, 1990 
Honorable Charles Clark, Chief Judge 
United States Court of Appeals 
Fifth Circuit 
245 East Capitol Street, Room 302 





I endorse, with enthusiasm, your proposed supplementary 
comment by the members of the Ad Hoc Committee to the Judicial 
Conference. 
Warm personal regards. 
cc: Honorable Lewis F. Powell 
Honorable Paul H. Roney 
Honorable Barefoot Sanders 
Mr. Albert Pearson 
Mr. William R. Burchill, Jr. 
- -
February 26, 1990 
Ad Hoc Committee Supplementary Comment 
Gentlemen: 
I have reviewed the proposed Supplementary Comment 
prepared by Judge Clark and Judge Roney. I congratulate 
them on an excellent draft . . I do have a few ideas for pos-
sible clarifications, and two proposed additions. 
1. Counsel Standards. We might note that Judge 
Lay's group abandons our "opt-in" approach, in which States 
gain in finality in return for providing counsel. Instead, 
Judge Lay's proposal makes state habeas counsel mandatory in 
all cases under the threat of removing procedural default 
and exhaustion rules and eliminating the presumption of cor-
rectness of state court factfinding. His proposal would 
create a new right of "effective assistance" on state habe-
as, to be litigated case by case. This would result in in-
creased litigation. 
2. Down Time. I would delete the comment that this 
is a "judgment call." That could be interpreted as a state-
ment that the 180-day period is not important to our propos-
al. You may want to note that under Judge Lay's plan the 
limitations period does not begin to run until after state 
habeas. This would omit one of the benefits of our plan --
the elimination of the execution warrant as the method to 
move litigation along in the state system. Also, if the 
limitations period does not run until the state habeas pro-
ceedings end, then there should be no automatic stay of exe-
cution until that time. 
3. Successive Petitions. It might be desirable to 
comment separately on the Biden, Lay, and ABA changes as to 
successive petitions, and on their changes as to retroactiv-
ity. The present draft Supplementary Comment handles both 
of these under the successive petition heading. The draft 
- - 2 • 
correctly points our that the Biden/ ABA/Lay approach to suc-
cessive petitions essentially provides no limits, and in 
fact may make successive petitions more available. This 
would hardly be in the public interest or consistent with a 
rational system of criminal justice. The Biden, ABA, and 
Lay proposals also separately propose statutory overruling 
of Teague v. Lane, the 1989 Supreme Court decision adopting 
Justice Harlan's approach to retroactivity on federal habeas 
corpus. I do not think the Judicial Conference should con-
sider overruling this recent decision of the Supreme Court. 
I would omit the mention of retroactivity and "overruling 
Supreme Court precedent" under the "successive petitions" 
heading, and add a separate discussion of retroactivity 
along the lines of the attached "Rider A," that could follow 
the successive petition section. 
4. Procedural Default. The Ad Hoc Committee report 
does not suggest any change in the current law of procedural 
default governed by Wainwright v. Sykes and its progeny. 
The Biden, ABA, and Lay proposals favor sweeping changes in 
the law. They propose, in varying degrees, to do away with 
state procedural default rules. This undermines the valid 
state interest in having objections raised at trial, when 
they can be dealt with, and not years later in habeas liti-
gation on the eve of execution. By changing the law of pro-
cedural default in a manner far more favorable to defend-
ants, these competing proposals ensure more delay than under 
the present system. I think we should add a new section 
opposing this attempt to overrule existing precedent in 
order to create more delay and piecemeal litigation. I at-
tach a proposed "Rider B," that might follow the section on 
"Down Time." 
The foregoing are merely suggestions. I emphasize 
again our debt to Judges Clark and Roney for taking on this 
project long after our Committee has been "discharged." 
The Chief Justice 










Retroactivity. The Ad Hoc Committee Report does not 
alter present law with respect to the retroactivity of new rules 
of criminal law. The Biden Bill, the ABA Task Force, and Judge 
Lay's group propose overruling Supreme Court precedent to make 
retroactivity rules more favorable to capital inmates. 
Comment. Under the recent Supreme 
Court decision in Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 
1060 (1989), a new rule of criminal procedure 
will not be applied retroactively on federal 
habeas unless the new rule places an entire 
category of conduct of defendants beyond the 
reach of the law, or the new rule is "implic-
it in ordered liberty." This current retro-
activity law correctly reflects that federal 
habeas corpus should serve as a vehicle to 
correct errors in state judgments. It should 
not serve as a forum to argue for new rules 
of law, which would then be applied to over-
turn state court judgments that were correct 
at the time they were decided. No principle 
of justice or fairness is served by allowing 
a habeas petitioner to challenge his convic-
tion on the basis of law that was not on the 
books at the time of his crime, trial, or 
appeal. As the Supreme Court, citing Judge 
Friendly, stated in Teague: "Application of 
constitutional rules not in existence at the 
time a conviction became final seriously un-
dermines the principle of finality which is 
essential to the operation of our criminal 
justice system." 109 S. Ct., at 1074. Ret-
roactivity is an area that has been tradi-
tionally handled by the courts, not by legis-
lation. The proposed statutory changes in 
retroactivity under the Biden, ABA, and Lay 
proposals will worsen the present situation 
with respect to finality and federal state 
relations in the area of capital habeas cor-
pus without any gain in fairness. 
- - 2 - -
Rider B 
Procedural Default. The Ad Hoc Committee Report 
does not propose any alteration of the present law with respect 
to procedural default. The Biden, ABA, and Lay proposals, howev-
er, propose dramatic alteration of this entire area of the law. 
Comment. The Biden, ABA, and 
Lay proposals would, under various formula-
tions, require that federal courts ignore 
state procedural default rules any time the 
failure to raise a claim was due to "igno-
rance or neglect" of the prisoner or counsel. 
These proposals would overrule by legislation 
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), and 
the entire line of cases that follows it. 
State procedural default rules serve the val-
id purpose of requiring objections to be 
raised at trial, when corrective measures can 
be taken, not years later in a federal habeas 
petition. The drastic change advocated by 
the Biden, ABA and Lay proposals would again 
promote delay and piecemeal litigation. Ad-
dition of this provision to any reform pack-
age would make its passage less likely, and 
eliminate any incentive for the States to 
support it. 
- -
February 27 , 1990 
Ad Hoc committee on Federal qaheas 
Dear Chief : 
I am sure you know that a number of new proposals 
with respect to federal habeas have or will be submitted to 
the Judicial Conference . These include proposals by Judge 
Lay, Judge Holloway , and the ABP. Committee . As I unc'ierstand 
these proposals , they could result in greater opportunities 
to abuse the writ of habeas corpus than exist at present . 
Chief Judge Charles Clark and Judge Pau1 Roney -
both on our. Ad Hoc Committee - have drafted a statement to 
be submitted to the Conference tha t strongly supports the 
recommendations of our Committee . I have reviewed this , and 
with the help of. Hew Pate, have sugqested some changes. I 
have sent you a copy of my letter to Judges Clark and Roney. 
I received (a weP.k or so ago), the enclosed undated 
nraft of a letter from the Justice Department to Senator 
Biden . This draft also strongly supports the conclusions 
and recommendations of our Committee. It is my unaerstand-
inq that this letter has been circulated among Senators and 
Members of Congress . In view of what wi11 be before the 
Judicial Conference, perhaps you could suggest that this or 
a similar letter be sent by the Justice Department to the 
Judicial Conference . 
I believe that ChiAf Judge Clark , Chairman of the 
Conference Executive Committee , will present the memorandum 
that he ~nd Paul Roney prepared . 
I write this letter to be sure that you are famil-
iar with these developments . In view of the possibility 
that this legislation could make the situation worse, it may 
be prudent to leave the present law undisturbed . 







J~ • + 
Judge Charles Clark 
Al Pearson 
UGA Law School 
Re: Second Petition Study 
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Enclosed is a copy of the preliminary1 study that I have 
conducted on second or successive petitions in death penalty 
cases. The c~st cons~al1 c :i:Ycui tcc5lir ta ncr Supreme 
cou?' t decisions since 1976 involvin the a eatn ena l ty. The case 
list a oeen compiled overt e years and kept up to date by the 
capital litigation unit in the Alabama Attorney General's office. 
I had a team of third year law students look up every 
case on this list. I wanted them to classify every case as 
either a first or a second or successive petition case. In 
addition, I wanted to know whether the case was decided on 
substantive or procedural grounds and, if on the former, whether 
relief was granted or denied. 
My overall ~bjective was to determine how important the 
availability of secon<t"' or -successive petitions has been to the 
fairness of the death penalty litigation process. 
As the statistical summary and Exhibit 1 reflect, the 
number of 1successful 11 second or successive petitions -- either 6 
or8depend.1.ng on~your count ing method :_ _ .... is quite low when you 
recognize that 481 decisions were rendered on the merits 
through December 31, 1989. Bear in mind that I leave out 73 
circuit court decisions where the opinion involved a remand on 
procedural grounds. 
In Exhibit 2, you have the citations to the 6 or 8 
decisions involving the grant of relief in second or successive 
petition cases. Arguably, if c p e co nse 
a vai'fable to the defendant throughout state and federal habeas 
litigation, relief could and should have been granted in each 
case except Adams v. Wainwright, 804 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1986), 
when the first habeas petition was considered. 
1 I describe the study as preliminary because I have not 
personally checked all the cases listed. This was done by third 
year law students under my direction and supervision. 
.. - -
The results suggest fairly strongly that the Powell 
Committee's I)roposed curtailment of second or successive 
petitions will not heighten the chance of a miscarriage of 
justice in any death penalty case. In fact, when one considers } 
the benefits of continuous legal representation which the Powell 
Committee report favors in state and federal post conviction 
review, ~apital defendants really gain more than the states. 
NOTE ON METHODOLOGY 
A case was classified as either a first or second (or 
successive) petition based on the procedural history given in the 
opinion. By and large, the opinions in second (or successive) 
petition cases explicitly recognized their procedural posture as 
such. I don't think we made many errors, if any, at this level 
of differentiation. 
After designating a case as a first or second (or 
successive) petition, we then described how the court disposed of 
the case. If a court addressed the issues on the merits or found 
some or all procedurally barred, we counted the decision as being 
on the merits and indicated a relief grant or relief denial. If 
relief was granted, we indicated whether the conviction was 
reversed or whether the sentence only was reversed. 
Of course, because of certain habeas corpus doctrines like 
the exhaustion requirement, a significant number of cases were 
remanded for further consideration by the district courts or the 
state courts. Such cases were noted by the entry "remand 
procedural grounds." 
A final category -- "not applicable" -- was emp l oyed to 
describe cases that did not fit into one of the preceding 
classifications. They happened to be picked up on the case list 
because they involved judicial action which resulted in an 
official reporter citation. The following list is illustrative 
of the "not applicable" category: 
1. Petitions for rehearing 
2. Application for a writ of mandamus 
3. Filing of petition for certiorari 
4. Motion to stay execution 
5. Petition for certificate of probable cause to appeal 
6. Appeal dismissal because district order was not final 
7. Section 1983 actions 
8. Motions to recall mandate 
9. Order granting stay of execution 
10. Order consolidating cases 
/ 
cc: Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 




This memorandum briefly describes the statistical data 
reflected in Exhibit Number 1, a copy of which is attached. 
The universe of cases considered numbers 677. Since three 
(3) cases address both a first petition and a second petition, 
and two ( 2 ) cases report two individual second petitions 
consolidated into one case, 
accurately totals 682. 
the total cases considered more 
Of the 682 cases noted above, 548 cases are segregated 
into the first petition category. However, as will be described 
in the methodology memorandum, many of these 548 cases are not 
true habeus corpus cases. Breaking down the 548 cases in the 
first petition category, the data reflects the following: 
(1) Relief was granted in 145 cases, 
(2) Relief was denied in 226 cases, 
(3) 61 cases were remanded for procedural grounds, and 
(4) 116 cases were categorized as not applicable 
opinions . 
134 of the 682 cases are categorized as second or successive 
petition cases. Of these 134, relief was denied in 102 cases; 
12 cases were remanded for procedural grounds and 12 opinions 
were categorized as not applicable. In the remaining eight ( 8) 
second or successive petition cases, relief was granted. These 
eight (8) cases are briefly described in Exhibit Number 2, a copy 
of which is attached . 
-
Exhibit Number 1 
TOTAL ENTRIES = 677 * 
FIRST PETITIONS= 548 
Relief Granted= 145 
Relief Denied= 226 
Remand Procedural Grounds = 61 
Not Applicable= 116 
SECOND PETITIONS= 134 
Relief Granted= 8 xx 
Relief Denied= 102 
Remand Procedural Grounds = 12 
Not Applicable = 12 
-
x Three (3) entries reported both a first and a second petition 
within the same opinion. Two (2) entries reported two 
individual second petitions, consolidated into one case. 
-:H:- One petitioner succeeded in two individual second petitions 
at the Circuit Court level, both consolidated and addressed 
as one case . The Supreme Court vacated both grants of 
relief and remanded to the Circuit Court . Upon reconsider-
ation by the Circuit Court, relief was again granted in 
both petitions . Statistically, this case is reported twice, 
reflecting four relief grants at the second petition level, 
two in each Circuit Court opinion. However, subs tan ti vely, 
this case should be considered as granting relief in only 
two petitions at the second petition level . Thus, it should 
be considered that relief has been granted in six ( 6) cases 
rather than eight (8) cases. 
-
CASE NAME 
Adams v. Wainwright, 
804 F.2d 1526 
(11th Cir . 1986) 
Deut s cher v. Whitley, 
884 F.2d 1152 
(9th Cir. 1989) 
Evans v. Lewis, 
855 F.2d 631 
(9th Cir. 1988) 
Potts v. Kemp , 
814 F.2d 1512 
(11th Cir. 1987) 
Note: 
Potts v. Zant, 
734 F.2d 526 
(11th Cir. 1984) 
Note : 
Songer v. Wainwright, 
769 F . 2d 14 88 
(11th Cir. 1985) 
-
Exhibit Number 2 
PETITION NUMBER RELIEF GROUNDS 
Second Sentence Caldwell v. 
Reversed Mississippi 
Violation 
Second Sentence Ineffective 
Reversed Assistance 
of Counsel 
Second Sentence Ineffective 
Reversed Assistance 
of Counsel 
Second ( 1 ) Conviction Faulty Jury 
Reversed Instruction 
( 2 ) Sentence Prosecutorial 
Reversed Misconduct in 
Argument 
Two separate petitions were consolidated 
in this opinion. Relief was granted in 
each petition. 









Same case as Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512 
(11th Cir. 1987) . Supreme Court vacated 
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FIFT~ CIRCUIT 
February 27, 1990 
(VIA FACSIMILE) 
FOR THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
March 13-14, 1990 
TO MEMBERS OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL HABEAS 
CORPUS REVIEW OF CAPITAL SENTENCES 
Justice Powell has made excellent suggestions and I 
have attempted to incorporate them in the proposed redraft. 
I have omitted the reference to the Federal Court Study 
Committee draft report since I am advised the final report 
will take no position on any proposal, In the text of 
Justice Powell's "Rider A and Rider B," I have taken the 
editorial license he extended and deleted cites (which I 
ceo11 8111 •01 !1 
don't expect Conference members to consult on reading our 
otherwise informal comment), one sentence which I took to 
largely paraphrase the quote from Teague, and an adjective \ 
and adverb or two. I have also added three sentences to the 
final paragraph of the comment on successive petitions to 
reflect the statistical ~ork just completed by P~ofessor 
Pearson. 
Would all of you take another look and give me the 
benefit of your suggestions? 
Attachment 
Distribution: 
Justice Lewis F. Powell 
Judge William Terrell Hodges* 
Judge Paul H. Roney* 
Judge Barefoot Sanders* 
Professor Albert Pearson 
Mr. William R. Burchil 
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*with copy of Professor Pearson's summary sheet 
- -
February 28, 1990 
Dear Al: 
Thank you for sending me a copy of your memorandum 
to Chief Judge Charles Clark, together with your "prelimi-
nary study". I must say it hardly looks preliminary. 
Subject to taking a closer look, the results of the 
study are as follows: 
1. 682 cases were reviewed. 
2. 548 of these were the first habeas petition 
filed. Not all of these were "true" habeas corpus cases. 
3. Relief was granted in 145 cases, denied in 226. 
61 cases were remanded on non-habeas grounds, and 116 cases 
were "categorized as not applicable opinions." 
We are primarily interested in successive habeas 
petitions. The study states that 134 of the 682 cases were 
second or third petition cases. Of these, relief was denied 
in 102 cases; 12 were remanded on non-habeas grounds, and 
the other cases were inapplicable. 
The most significant statistic is that of the 134 
second or successive petition cases, relief was granted in 
only 8 of them .. 
Sincerely, 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 
School of Law 
University of Georgia 
Athens, Georgia 30602 
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Professor Pearson's Study of Second Habeas cases 
MEMO TO HEW: 
I enclose Al's Statistical Summary. The bottom 
line statistic, if I understand Al correctly, is that of the 
134 second or successive habeas petition cases only 8 re-
sulted in relief being granted. 
I am sending you the first four pages in Al's large 
study that takes up each of the successive petition cases. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
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